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1Abstract: This paper charts the history of the CDC’s role in the regulation of biological agents, from its origins
in the early 1970s as a monitor of physical package security to its current position as a barrier between would-
be terrorists and their weapons. First, the paper discusses CDC regulation between 1971 and 1996, an era
characterized by a narrow CDC approach to oversight focused on the physical safety of packages moving in
interstate commerce. Next, the paper analyzes the rapid expansion of the CDC’s regulatory authority in
the late 1990s to respond to the rising threat of bioterrorism, highlighting the challenges that emerged for
an agency with little enforcement experience and possessing conﬂicting obligations towards the “industry” it
regulated: the scientiﬁc community. Finally, the paper highlights several outstanding issues facing the CDC
as it continues to enhance its regulatory mission.
I.
Introduction
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), located in Atlanta, Georgia, is
one of the world’s foremost public health institutions. As the lead federal agency charged with protecting the
health and safety of United States citizens, the CDC works to diminish the threat of communicable disease
by developing and applying disease prevention strategies, promoting environmental health initiatives, and
improving state and local public health programs.
Since 1971, the CDC has sought to advance this mission by regulating the interstate shipment of biological
agents. Biological – or etiologic – agents, the naturally occuring and sometimes genetically engineered
microorganisms that cause infectious disease, have long been a subject of academic research by scientists
seeking to eradicate the most deadly human scourges. The development of vaccines throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and subsequent eﬀorts to eradicate diseases such as smallpox and polio, were largely
based on studies of agent properties and characteristics. Today, research laboratories across the country hold
expansive inventories of hundreds of biological agents, including those organisms that cause diseases such
as anthrax, plague, and Ebola. Microbiologists and other researchers use these agents as reference cultures
to minimize the incidence of illness and death due to infectious disease, and more recently, to increase the
nation’s preparedness for acts of bioterrorism. Because an accidental or intentional agent release could
have profound public health consequences, the CDC subjects laboratories and other entities possessing
and transferring agents to extensive regulatory oversight. As several commenters have noted, the CDC’s
regulatory measures may be the only barrier between a terrorist and his or her potential weapon.
2However, the CDC’s regulatory role has not always been marked by aggressive agent oversight. In fact, until
real fears of a bioterrorist strike emerged in the mid-1990s, the CDC’s authority was narrowly limited to
ensuring that the shipment of biological agents minimized any risk of agent release into the environment. As
a result of this narrow focus, and its lack of regulatory experience outside of biological agent control, many
contemporary critics have questioned the CDC’s institutional competence as a regulatory body in an age of
bioterrorism, particularly as national security interests arguably demand greater federal vigilence and a law
enforcement focus. Moreover, as the CDC’s regulatory role has expanded to respond to the new threat of
bioterrorism, the agency has increasingly struggled to balance measures designed to improve public safety
with the need to protect the free exchange of cultures by its public health partners for legitimate research
purposes. Instead of enhancing domestic security, extreme measures to control agents – even to guard against
bioterrorists – could harm the nation’s health if scientists cannot obtain cultures for biodefense purposes or
to conduct infectious disease research.
This paper charts the history of the CDC’s role in the regulation of biological agents, from its origins in the
early 1970s as a monitor of physical package security to its current position as a barrier between would-be
terrorists and their weapons. First, the paper discusses CDC regulation between 1971 and 1996, an era
characterized by a narrow CDC approach to oversight focused on the physical safety of packages moving in
interstate commerce. Next, the paper analyzes the rapid expansion of the CDC’s regulatory authority in
the late 1990s to respond to the rising threat of bioterrorism, highlighting the challenges that emerged for
an agency with little enforcement experience and possessing conﬂicting obligations towards the “industry” it
regulated: the scientiﬁc community. Finally, the paper highlights several outstanding issues facing the CDC
as it continues to enhance its regulatory mission.
While the thrust of this paper is historical analysis, the issues related to the CDC’s regulation of biological
agents implicate a number of policy debates, some of which are touched upon in this discussion. For example,
as agent regulation shifts even further from a public health to a law enforcement problem, questions are
undoubtedly raised about whether the CDC is the proper institutional body in which to vest regulatory
authority. Similarly, because of the importance of biological agents to a number of legitimate research
goals – namely, disease eradication and the development of appropriate biodefense measures – real concerns
remain about whether the CDC, at Congress’ mandate, has entered an age of dangerous overregulation.
While resolution of those policy issues will clearly be important as the CDC gains more experience and
3eﬀectiveness in agent regulation, those questions are not the the main focus of this paper, and thus are not
given the level of attention or detail they deserve. The aim of this paper is far more modest: to explain how
the CDC – traditionally an agency with no regulatory power – received its current role in the oversight of
biological agents, and to demonstrate the challenges that have accompanied the CDC as its mandate has
expanded in response to the current threat of bioterrorism.
II.
CDC Agent Regulation 1971-1996: A Focus on Physical Safety
The CDC was established in 1942 as a component of the U.S. Public Health Service.1 Initially named
the “Malaria Control in War Areas” unit, the institution’s goal was relatively narrow: to combat malaria
outbreaks, which at the time were threatening the success of the U.S. war eﬀort.2 However, in 1946, the
unit was renamed the “Communicable Disease Center,” and broadened its mission appropriately.3 In the
decades immediately following World War II, CDC eﬀorts grew to include research on diseases of zoological
origin and eventually surveillance of all health epidemics within the domestic United States.4 With the
advent of President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” in the early 1960s, the CDC’s role expanded even
further to encompass public health programs as diverse as family planning, lead-based paint poisoning, and
international disease eradication.5 In 1970, the CDC changed its name for the last time, to the familiar
“Centers for Disease Control.”6 In 1973, it was oﬃcially elevated to agency status.7 Today, the CDC
employs over 8,500 individuals in 170 disciplines and plays a critical part in protecting the nation from the
“most widespread, deadly, and mysterious threats” against human health.8
The regulation of etiologic materials was not one of the CDC’s primary duties until August 3, 1971, when
the Department of Health Services and Mental Health Administration (“DHSMHA”), a subdivision of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“DHEW”), oﬃcially delegated to the CDC its authority to
regulate the interstate shipment of etiologic agents and vectors.9 As a result of this delegation, the CDC
1Elizabeth Etheridge, Sentinel for Health: A history of the Centers for Disease Control xv (University of
California Press 1992).
2Id.
3Id. at xv-xvi.
4Id. at xvi.
5Id. at xvii.
6Id.
7Id.
8See “About CDC,” www.cdc.gov.
9Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 36 Fed. Reg. 14280 (August 3, 1971). Under 42
U.S.C. § 264, DHEW, predecessor to the contemporary Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter, “DHHS”), was
4received its ﬁrst – and, to date, only – regulatory mission, and assumed control of the oﬃcial shipping,
packaging, and labeling requirements delineated at 42 C.F.R § 72.25.10
Including CDC in the regulation of the packaging and shipping of agents was intended to ﬁll a critical gap in
federal oversight of potentially infectious materials moving in interstate commerce: protection of the public
health. Prior to the DHSMHA’s delegation, several federal agencies were already involved in regulating
the packaging, labeling, and shipment of infectious materials within the United States. The Department
of Transportation’s Hazardous Materials regulations, 49 CFR 171-180, governed the interstate transport by
surface or air of infectious substances, medical waste, and chemical and radioactive materials.11 Similarly,
the United States Postal Service regulated the shipment of etiologic agents, clinical specimens, and other
biological products through the mail, 39 CFR 111.12 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a
division of the Department of Labor, monitored worker safety during the handling, packaging, and transport
of human blood, bodily ﬂuids, unﬁxed tissues, and organs and cell cultures, 29 CFR 1910.13 Lastly, the
Department of Commerce maintained a list of restricted items, including microorganisms, that could not
be exported from the United States, 15 CFR 768-799.14 While these agencies brought important expertise
authorized to promulgate regulations to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable disease. See 42
U.S.C. §264; see also Packaging and Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022 (proposed Oct.
28, 1999) (to be codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72), for a brief discussion of the delegation. DHEW initially delegated supervisory
authority over the interstate transportation of etiologic agents to DHSMHA on May 14, 1971. Redelegation by the Assistant
Secretary for Health and Scientiﬁc Aﬀairs, 36 Fed. Reg. 8893 (May 14, 1971). Three months later, DHSMHA redelegated
this regulatory authority to the CDC. See infra. The delegation was not mandated by statute but was rather an internal
delegation conducted for reorganization purposes. E-mail from Arathi Almli, Attorney Advisor, Department of Health and
Human Services, Oﬃce of the General Counsel, to Catherine Manzi, Student, Harvard Law School (Feb. 26, 2004, 16:29:22
EST) (on ﬁle with author).
10At the time the CDC received regulatory authority, the shipping and packaging requirements were found at 42 C.F.R. pt.
72.25, entitled “Etiologic Agents.” See, e.g., Etiologic Agents, 36 Fed. Reg. 8815 (May 13, 1971) (to be codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 72). When the CDC revised this rule on July 21, 1980, it renumbered the rule’s provisions and oﬃcially changed the title of
42 CFR pt. 72 from “Etiologic Agents” to “Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents.” Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents,
45 Fed. Reg. 48626 (July 21, 1980) (to be codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72). The renumbered sections were found at 42 C.F.R. §§
72.1-72.5. Id.
11Department of Transportation, Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 C.F.R. Subtitle C, §§ 171-180 (2004). See also Pack-
aging and Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022, supra note 9, at 58023 for a discussion of
overlapping federal regulations in the area of biological agent control.
12United States Postal Service, General Information on Postal Service, 39 C.F.R. § 111 (2004). See also Packaging and
Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022, supra note 9 at 58023.
13Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Toxic and Hazardous Substances, 29 C.F.R. §1910.1030 (2004). See also
Packaging and Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022, supra note 9, at 58023.
14Commerce and Trade, Foreign Availability Determination Procedures and Criteria, 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-799 (2004). See also
Packaging and Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022, supra note 9, at 58023. Several
international organizations were also involved in monitoring the transport and shipment of biological agents. First, the United
Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods made recommendations on the international transport of
infectious substances and clinical specimens, which were themselves included in the International Civil Aeronatics Organization
technical instructions. Id. Second, the International Air Transport Association published the Dangerous Goods Regulations,
which described for member airlines the U.N. recommendations for the air transport of biological materials, as well as relevant
national guidelines. Id.
5to bear on the issue of safety in agent transportation, they did not possess the institutional competence of
the CDC in infectious disease control, and their regulations did not address public health concerns. More
speciﬁcally, involving the CDC in packaging and shipment regulation allowed for an eﬀective federal response
to health concerns that arise due to damage to packages carrying deadly pathogens.15
The agent shipping and packaging requirements, 42 C.F.R § 72.25, initially promulgated by the Surgeon Gen-
eral with the approval of DHEW, were designed to protect the public health by minimizing any potential for
(1) direct physicial contact with packages containing highly dangerous biological material, (2) contamination
of the physical environment, and (3) spread of disease into the community.16 At the time of the DHSMHA
delegation to the CDC, the regulation – in the process of amendment – included ﬁve fundamental compo-
nents. First, the regulation established an oﬃcial deﬁnition of “etiologic agent,” and speciﬁed 31 diseases
covered by the deﬁnition and thus subject to the rule.17 According to the regulation, no etiologic agent
could knowingly be transported in interstate commerce without meeting packaging standards.18 Second, the
regulation provided speciﬁc guidance on the appropriate packaging and labeling of biological materials for
transport, including the physical requirements for agent containers, the proper use of dry ice, the maximum
volume of agent allowed per shipment, and the shipping documents to be eﬀected for a legal transfer.19
Third, the regulation instituted measures to be taken in the event of damage during transport.20 Fourth,
the regulation mandated isolation of all aﬀected areas following an agent release, pending clearance by the
Surgeon General.21 Finally, the regulation speciﬁed procedures for notifying authorities if an agent package
was not received.22
For the ﬁrst twenty-ﬁve years of its regulatory mandate, the CDC did not take an aggressive approach to
regulation. In fact, the CDC instituted only two revisions to the DHEW’s intial rule between 1971 and
15Packaging and Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022, supra note 9, at 58023.
16Id. at 58024. The Surgeon General ﬁrst proposed inserting § 72.25 to govern the shipment of etiologic agents on December
18, 1956. See Interstate Quarantine, Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 21 Fed. Reg. 10015 (Dec. 18, 1956) (to be codiﬁed at 42
C.F.R. pt. 72). The Surgeon General issued a ﬁnal rule codifying § 72.25 a year later. See Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 22
Fed. Reg. 954 (Feb. 1957) (to be codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
17See Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 22 Fed. Reg. 954 (Feb. 1957) (to be codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72). “Etiologic agent”
was deﬁned as the causative agent of a speciﬁc list of diseases regulated under the rule and listed by name in § 72.25(a), as well
as “such others as may be prescribed from time to time by the Surgeon General.” Id. at §72.25(a).
18Id. The restrictions on transportation were codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(b).
19Id. The packaging requirements were codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(b)(1)-(5).
20Id. The provisions concerning lost or damaged packages were codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(c)(1)-(7).
21Id. The isolation mandate was codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(d).
22Id. The notiﬁcation provision was codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(e).
61996, both aimed at ensuring better physical protection of transported materials. First, following a notice
of proposed rulemaking issued by DHEW on May 13, 1971, the CDC implemented an amended rule on
June 30, 1972.23 The amended rule revised the deﬁnition of “etiologic agent” to correspond to speciﬁc
categories of causative agents (bacteria, viruses) rather than individually-named infectious diseases, added a
deﬁnition of “diagnostic specimen” to the regulation, and detailed a list of nearly 90 bacterial, fungal, viral,
and rickettsial agents to be aﬀected by the packaging and shipment requirements.24 It extended minimum
packaging requirements to biological products, mandated shipment via registered mail for 11 highly infectious
agents, replaced U.S. liquid measurements with metric measurements, tightened container requirements, and
redesigned the DHEW-imposed hazardous materials warning label to mirror Department of Transportation
identiﬁcation standards.25 Second, following publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking on November
21, 1979, indicating its intention to “expand and clarify” packaging, labeling, and shipping requirements for
biological cultures and products and update the list of infectious agents covered by the rule, the CDC issued
another amended rule on July 21, 1980.26 The 1980 rule tranferred the provisions relating to interstate
quarantine to the Food and Drug Administration and changed the title of the regulation from “Etiologic
Agents” to “Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents.”27 More importantly, the new rule included a deﬁnition
of “interstate traﬃc,” added several agents to the list of monitored bacteria, viruses, fungi, and rickettsia, and
clariﬁed restrictions on shipping containers and warning labels.28 Finally, the 1980 amendment renumbered
the rule’s subparts for greater ease of administration.29
The CDC’s 1980 rule remained unamended until 1996. Because the CDC rule was intended solely to prevent
23Etiologic Agents, 37 Fed. Reg. 12915 (June 30, 1972) (to be codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
24Id. Notably, for the purposes of the amended rule, “etiologic agent” was deﬁned as “a viable microorganism or its toxin
which causes human disease.” Id. “Diagnostic specimen” was deﬁned to mean “any human or animal material including, but
not limited to, excreta, secreta, blood and its components, tissue, and tissue ﬂuids.” Id. These deﬁnitions were codiﬁed at 42
C.F.R. § 72.25(a). Id. The agent list was codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(c).
25Id. The restrictions on packaging and labeling were codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.25(d)-(h).
26Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 45 Fed. Reg. 48626, supra note 10. After publishing its notice of proposed
rulemaking in November 1979, the CDC invited written comments, to be received before January 21, 1980. By the time
the comment period expired, the CDC had received written and telephone comments from “a limited number” of interested
parties. The comments in large part concerned notice requirements in the event of delayed receipt of an agent shipment, overlap
between the CDC hazard warning label and other labeling requirements imposed by the International Air Transport Association
(“IATA”), expansion of the etiologic agent list to include speciﬁc biological materials, confusion over nomenclature, and the
maximum volume of agent allowed per package. Few of the comments were incorporated into the ﬁnal rule. See id.
27See id at 48627.
28See id at 48628-9. To give just one example of the clariﬁcations instituted by the new rule, “nonparticulate absorbent
material,” required when shipping agents in aggregate volumes of less than 50 ml, was noted to include “paper towels.” Id.
29See infra note 2. The new subsections were: § 72.1, Deﬁnitions; § 72.2, Transportation of Diagnostic Specimens, Biological
Products, and Other Materials, Minimum Packaging Requirements; § 72.3, Transportation of Materials Containing Certain
Etiologic Agents, Minimum Packaging Requirements; § 72.4, Notice of Delivery, Failure to Receive; and § 72.5 Requirements;
Variations.
7unsafe distribution of hazardous materials by legitimate research facilities, it did not impose restrictions
on agent acquisition or possession. In fact, under the pre-1996 regulatory regime, any individual could
legally procure an etiologic agent, subject only to self-imposed – and often minimal – seller restrictions.
CDC oversight was only relevant to post-acquisition shipment across state lines.30 Consequently, the CDC
regime did little to prevent misappropriation or misuse of etiologic agents.31 As one commentator noted, the
regulation was developed for “narrow purposes in an era when most lawmakers did not consider domestic
bioterrorism as a realistic possibility.”32 It was not until the passage of the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) that the CDC’s regulatory role shifted to respond to the rising threat of
bioterrorism.
III.
From Physical Safety to National Security: The CDC Responds to the Threat of Bioterrorism
The ﬁrst major expansion of the CDC’s regulatory authority to account for new dangers related to the threat
of bioterrorism occurred in reaction to two high-proﬁle incidents involving the illicit acquisition of poisonous
material. In mid-March 1995, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released nerve gas in an unprecedented
attack on the Tokyo subway, killing 12 and injuring another 5,000.33 Although Aum’s weapon of choice –
sarin – was of chemical origin, an investigation into the attack revealed a disconcerting 10-year quest by the
cult to develop lethal biological weapons.34 Notably, the cult had purchased a 48,000-acre range in Australia
for use as a “biological weapons laboratory,” sent members to Zaire in an attempt to obtain samples of the
highly lethal Ebola virus, and undertook at least four separate – though ultimately unsuccesful – bioterrorist
strikes in Japan before the March attack.35 Arrested cult members admitted plans to attack both New York
30See 142 Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed. March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary), at S1862; see also Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Barth Reller, Member of the Board for the American Type Culture Collection and
Director of Clinical Microbiology, Duke University Medical Center).
31See Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 417,
448 (2001).
32Heather A. Dagen, Bioterrorism: Perfectly Legal, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 535, 555 (2000).
33James H. Anderson, Microbes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism, Heritage Foundation Reports
No. 1182, May 26, 1998, p. 4; see also Leonard A. Cole, The Specter of Biological Weapons, Sci. Am., Dec. 1996, available at
http:// www.sciam.com/ 1296issue/1296cole.html.
34Id.
35Id.at 5.
8and Washington, D.C. with puriﬁed biological material.36 On May 5, less than six weeks after the Aum’s
Tokyo subway release, Larry Wayne Harris, a trained microbiologist and lieutenant in the neo-nazi group
Aryan Nations, succeeded in ordering three vials of yersinia pestis, the biological agent that causes bubonic
plague, from the American Type Culture Collection (“ATCC”) in Rockville, MD.37 To obtain the cultures,
Harris had provided the ATCC with a copy of his membership certiﬁcate from the American Society for Mi-
crobiologists and a letter indicating that he owned the Small Animal Microbiology Laboratory, a non-existent
research facility allegedly certiﬁed and approved by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.38 Despite
the fact that plague is treatable with standard antibiotics, Harris told the ATCC that he needed the agent
for research designed to “counteract Iraqi rats carrying ‘supergerms.”’39 His actions were deemed suspicious
only when he contacted the ATCC four days after his request to determine why the cultures had not yet
arrived.40 Harris eventually pled guilty to mail fraud and was sentenced to eighteen months probation by a
federal court.41 As one observer noted, to obtain the plague bacteria, Harris needed “no more than a credit
card and a false letterhead.”42
Both the Harris and Aum incidents sent a warning signal to policymakers and the public regarding the
ease with which terrorists and other uncertiﬁed individuals could access deadly pathogens. The Department
of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), the federal agency responsible for the state of domestic health,
responded quickly to what was portrayed as a classic failure in oversight. In early June, the Department
directed the CDC to chair, along with the DHHS Oﬃce of Emergency Preparedness (“OEP”), an informal,
interdepartmental working group charged with reviewing existing agent controls.43 The working group,
composed primarily of federal scientists and health professionals, met throughout the summer of 1995 to
examine the safeguards in place for the sale of Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 4 organisms and recom-
binant DNA products, and to analyze the adequacy of the laws and regulations governing the acquisition
36Id.
37Jill Riepenhoﬀ & Jim Woods, Plague Vials Found in Car; Lancaster Man Charged, Got Cultures Through the Mail,
Columbus Dispatch, May 13, 1995, at 1A; Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, supra
note 31, at 449. Professional societies of scientists established the American Type Culture Collection in 1925 as a clearinghouse
for pure strains of microorganisms. Its stock numbers 82,000 frozen cultures. See Karl Vick, Man Gets Hands on Bubonic
Plague Germ, but That’s No Crime, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1995, at D1.
38Riepenhoﬀ & Woods, supra note 37, at 1A.
39Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, supra note 31, at 449; see also Cole, supra
note 33, available at http:// www.sciam.com/ 1296issue/1296cole.html.
40Cole, supra note 33, available at http:// www.sciam.com/ 1296issue/1296cole.html.
41Robert Ruth, Harris Pleads Guilty, Is Free, Columbus Dispatch, March 25, 1998, at A1.
42Cole, supra note 33, available at http:// www.sciam.com/ 1296issue/1296cole.html.
43Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control).
9and shipment of etiologic agents.44 On the working group’s recommendation, Dr. Philip Lee, the DHHS
Assistant Secretary for Health, formed a second committee in August composed of representatives from
the CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institutes of Health to further study the
issue.45 The second committee – again co-chaired by the CDC and OEP – also included oﬃcials from the
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Postal Service, and U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
Transportation, who actively participated in the committee deliberations.46 The purpose of the committee,
which was broader than its informal predecessor, was to (1) integrate across federal departments, to the
greatest extent possible, existing regulations governing the shipment of infectious agents in interstate com-
merce, (2) prepare a list of agents to be monitored, (3) prepare a new legal framework for the enforcement of
agent controls, and (4) consider suitable criminal penalties to complement any regulatory oversight.47 The
committee was also charged with evaluating the necessity of a central registry for tracking the purchase of
restricted recombinant DNA materials.48 Over the course of the next year, the committee would propose a
signiﬁcant enhancement of the CDC’s regulatory role.
44Id. Four oﬃcial Biosafety Levels are outlined in the DHHS manual Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories.
See id. The most current version of the manual was published in 1999. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
& National Institutes of Health, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, Fourth Edition
(1999) (hereinafter, “BMBL”). The highest Biosafety Level, 4, pertains to agents that must be worked on under maximum
containment laboratory conditions. See Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for
Disease Control), supra note 43; see also BMBL at 13-14. There are currently two Biosafety Level 4 facilities in the U.S.: one at
CDC headquarters in Atlanta and the other at Fort Dietrick, MD. See Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for
Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control), supra note 43. Biosafety Level 3 pertains to agents that are dangerous in the
laboratory setting due to their facile transmission via needle stick or inhalation, but which are not as dangerous or infectious as
Biosafety Level 4 agents. See id; see also BMBL, at 13. In general, for agents classiﬁed at Biosafety Level 3, eﬀective treatments
or vaccines are not available. See Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for
Disease Control), supra note 43. Biosafety Level 2 is the level on which most work is done in clinical microbiology laboratories.
A Biosafety Level 2 certiﬁcation allows a laboratory to work with the vast majority of infectious agents that cause disease
but that do not pose great risk to laboratory workers. See id; see also BMBL, at 12-13. Finally, Biosafety Level 1 involves
work done on microorganisms that are not known to cause human disease. See Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National
Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control), supra note 43; see also BMBL, at 11-12.
45Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control), supra note 43.
46See id; see also Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. (1996) (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
47Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control), supra note 43.
48See id.
10Eight months into the interagency committee’s tenure, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on
the interstate transport of human pathogens, and invited group members to testify as to their ﬁndings. In
proceedings attended by members of the House of Representatives as well as oﬃcials from the Department of
Justice, the CDC, and the scientiﬁc community, the committee revealed signiﬁcant gaps in the regulation of
etiologic agents.49 Speciﬁcally, committee members testiﬁed that despite the existence of overlapping federal
regulations instituted by the CDC, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Commerce,
among others, governing the shipment of etiologic materials, no comprehensive legal framework existed to
control access to dangerous pathogens.50 In fact, as Senator Hatch noted, the only restrictions on access
to etiologic agents in 1995 were “imposed by the sellers of the pathogens themselves.”51 It was simply not
illegal for any individual to order a pathogen culture; instead, the system relied on private suppliers to
make “judgment calls” in accordance with internal laboratory policy.52 Mark Richard, the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, underlined that additional legislation
was needed to “tighten up the overall system” and to fully develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory
scheme.53 Congressman Markey concurred, emphasizing that he believed “quite ﬁrmly that we should just
pass a law to ensure that, permanently, there will be a control regime” placed over etiologic materials.54
At the time of the hearings, the CDC-chaired interagency committee had already developed preliminary re-
49Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996).
The witness list included Rep. John R. Kasich (R-OH, 12th); Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA, 7th); Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy
II (D-MA, 8th); Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice; James Hughes,
Assistant Surgeon General and Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
David N. Sundwall, President, American Clinical Laboratory Association; Kenneth Berns, President, American Society of
Microbiology, and Chairman, Department of Microbiology, Cornell University Medical College; and Barth Reller, Member of
the Board for the American Type Culture Collection and Director of Clinical Microbiology, Duke University Medical Center.
50Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice), supra note 46.
51See 142 Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed. March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch), supra note 30, at S1862. In introducing
the Biological Agents Enhanced Penalties and Controls Act, Senator Hatch noted that in 1996, biological agents were generally
available for three legitimate purposes. See id. First, small quantities of agents could be found in patient samples analyzed for
diagnostic purposes at clinical laboratories. See id. Second, scientists and medical professionals conducting legitimate clinical
research projects often used biological agents. See id. Third, the Department of Defense possessed a number of biological agents
used in developing protective strategies in the event of a wartime release. See id.
52Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (responding to
questions posed by Sen. Feinstein); see also Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of David N. Sundwall, President, American Clinical Laboratory Association,
in response to questions posed by Sen. Hatch) (discussing principles of conduct that apply in laboratories handling biological
agents).
53Id.
54Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Rep. Markey).
11visions to the CDC regulations governing the interstate shipment of etiologic materials, in close conjunction
with the scientiﬁc research community.55 The revisions allowed for collection of information concerning the
location of etiologic agents across the United States, as well as for certiﬁcation and tracking of agent trans-
fers between laboratories and other individuals.56 The revisions also established a process for alerting law
enforcement and appropriate federal authorities in the event of an unauthorized attempt to acquire a deadly
pathogen.57 According to the CDC, the revisions were consistent with the agency’s pre-existing authority
and could be formally prepared in as little as 180 days, although committee members admitted that further
modiﬁcations were necessary to ﬁnalize a list of restricted agents and to ensure that “appropriate protections
such as accountability, orderability, and adequate federal oversight of the program are included.”58 Never-
theless, while clearly supporting the interagency – and Congressional – call for greater agent controls, the
CDC appeared considerably more reticent about instituting a formal legal regime, primarily because of fears
that strict laws would obstruct legitimate and beneﬁcial scientiﬁc research. As James Hughes, Assistant
Surgeon General and Director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases at the CDC, stated, a formal
system would likely lead to the “inhibition of really high priority ongoing scientiﬁc research.”59 His view was
echoed by the three panelists representing scientiﬁc interests before the Judiciary Committee.60 In the words
of one panelist, any program to respond to the danger of unauthorized access to etiologic agents “should be
carefully weighed and...balanced to avoid over-regulation and intrusive schemes that could interfere with
the ﬂow of research activities in academia and industry.”61 Panelists from the scientiﬁc community also
emphasized that placing responsibility at the insitutional level would not only allow for appropriate moni-
55Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control), supra note 43.
56See id.
57See id.
58See id.; see also Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Hatch). Regarding CDC’s authority to regulate biological agents, see 142
Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed. March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), at
S1863 (noting that “the CDC has wide authority to regulate biological agents that pose a threat to human health, and could
establish rules limiting who may possess these agents”).
59Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control) (responding to
questions posed by Sen. Feinstein).
60Those three panelists were: David N. Sundwall, President, American Clinical Laboratory Association; Kenneth Berns,
President, American Society of Microbiology, and Chairman, Department of Microbiology, Cornell University Medical College;
and Barth Reller, Member of the Board for the American Type Culture Collection and Director of Clinical Microbiology, Duke
University Medical Center. See Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996).
61Interstate Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Kenneth Berns, President, American Society of Microbiology, and Chairman, Department of Microbiology, Cornell
University Medical College).
12toring but would also be “the least inhibitory to research.”62 The scientiﬁc community’s fears of suﬀocating
government regulation proved to be a harbinger of future debates surrounding the appropriate role of the
CDC and other federal agencies in the monitoring of agents. Despite their highly vocal insistence on stricter
agent controls, Chairman Hatch and other Judiciary Committee members softened their demands for the
most stringent measures in response to the objections.
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s reaction to the interagency testimony was swift. Chairman Orrin Hatch,
expressing concern that 180 days was an unacceptably long time to wait for the institution of a regulatory
scheme given the potentially catastophic results of unauthorized access, urged his colleagues to insert ad-
ditional language into the Antiterrorism Bill currently before the Senate.63 On March 12, 1996, only six
days after the close of the hearings, Hatch introduced S.1606, the Biological Agents Enhanced Penalties and
Control Act (“Biological Agents Act”), a bill eventually incorporated into the AEDPA.64 In introducing the
62See id. Dr. Reller also stated that “we need to ﬁnd an appropriate balance in the inherent dynamic tension between society’s
need to avoid misappropriation of biologicals for nefarious purposes and society’s interest in assuring minimally encumbered
availability and transferability of biologicals within the scientiﬁc and industrial communities.” Interstate Transportation of
Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Barth Reller,
Member of the Board for the American Type Culture Collection and Director of Clinical Microbiology, Duke University Medical
Center), supra note 30.
63Prior to the Senate hearings, Reps. John R. Kasich (R-OH, 12th), Edward J. Markey (D-MA, 7th), and Joseph P.
Kennedy II (D-MA, 8th) had introduced legislation in the House, the “Biological Weapons Restrictions Act of 1996,” to add
provisions criminalizing the misuse of biological organisms to existing laws related to weapons of mass destruction. See Interstate
Transportation of Human Pathogens: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of
Rep. Kennedy) (further noting that the FBI, CDC, and Department of Justice had unanimously recommended these provisions).
The Kasich-Markey-Kennedy legislation was successfully attached to the AEDPA and passed the House by a vote of 229-191.
See John M. Biers, House Votes to Punish Virus Terrorism, Sts. News Service, March 14, 1996. Rep. Markey further
introduced a bill requiring increased CDC oversight of dangerous pathogens, although his bill was eventually excluded from
the AEDPA for procedural reasons. See id. The Senate placed considerable pressure on the Clinton administration to respond
to the Harris incident through executive action. Following the Senate hearings, Senator Hatch, along with Senators Feinstein,
Specter, and Kohl, sent a letter to President Clinton urging that he direct the CDC to implement emergency procedures against
the threat of stolen pathogens on a priority basis. See 142 Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed. March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), supra note 30, at S1863. The Congressional pressure appeared to have
some eﬀect: on March 11, 1996, the day before the Senate introduced legislation imposing new restrictions on the transfer
of biological agents, CDC Director David Satcher dispatched a letter to laboratories known to be handling highly dangerous
pathogens requesting increased vigilance in their acquisition and transfer in order to minimize the risk of illicit access. See Letter
from David Satcher, Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, March 11, 1996, FDCH Federal Department and
Agency Documents. Satcher deﬁned “increased vigilance” to include reviewing all agent requests prior to transfer, determining
whether requested agents would be used for legitimate medical or scientiﬁc purposes, and reporting any suspicious inquiries or
transactions. See id. The Satcher letter also informed laboratories that the CDC would be proposing new regulations regarding
the acquisition and transfer of certain agents, with appropriate input from professional associations, the research community,
the public, and law enforcement. See id.
64See Dagan, supra note 32, at 553; see also Bill Summary & Status File for S. 1606, THOMAS: Legislative Information on
the Internet (hereinafter, “THOMAS”), a Library of Congress website, available at thomas.loc.gov, last visited on April 5,
2004. The Biological Agents Act was co-sponsored by Senators Feinstein, Thurmond, Dewine, Kohl, and Biden. See id.; see
also 142 Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed. March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary),
13Biological Agents Act, Hatch criticized the existing CDC packaging and shipping regulation for failing to
guard against illicit agent possession and use, failing to reﬂect scientiﬁc advances in the ﬁfteen years since its
last revision, and failing to avoid substantive overlap with other federal regulations governing the shipment
of biological material.65 The new legislation thus mandated that the CDC regulate the registration and
transfer of agents of “unique interest,” and oﬃcially charged the CDC with “preventing access to dangerous
biological agents for use in domestic and international terrorism or for any other purpose.” 66 The Act de-
ﬁned “biological agent” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 178, the criminal statute governing the illicit use of biological
weapons. This deﬁnition proved somewhat broader than the CDC’s earlier deﬁnition of “etiologic agent,”
encompassing “any microorganism...or infectious substance...capable of causing death, disease, or other
biological malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism,” as well as substances
“[capable of causing] deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind” or “[capable
of causing] deleterious alteration of the environment.”67 While seeking to balance the needs of the scientiﬁc
community to use and access agents without overly-burdensome oversight and the needs of the public to be
protected from potential bioterrorists, the Biological Agents Act instituted two signiﬁcant changes to the
supra note 30, at S1862. Reps. Kasich, Kennedy, and Markey authored the House version. See The Threat of Bioterrorism in
America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 36-37 (1999).
65Senator Hatch speciﬁcally criticized the CDC’s lack of momentum in his statements introducing the Biological Agents
Enhanced Penalties and Control Act. As Hatch stated: “unfortunately, eﬀorts by CDC and others have been slow. To date,
there have been at least two multiagency task forces established to look at this issue. The ﬁrst task force completed its work
and made recommendations in July 1995. The second task force is well underway in the development of a regulatory system,
but there does not appear to be a suﬃcient sense of urgency to get the job done.” See 142 Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed.
March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), supra note 30, at S1863. According
to Hatch, because the criminal code had gaps that prevented prosecution of an individual who obtained a biological agent
under false pretenses, and because anyone could legally possess an agent, waiting a year for ﬁnal rules was not acceptable
and legislative action thus necessary. See id. Senator Hatch also noted that regulations developed by the CDC, U.S. Postal
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Commerce, FDA, and U.S. Department of Transportation were
developed “with little or no apparent integration” and with narrow purposes in mind. See id. at S1862. In underlining that the
regulations had not kept pace with scientiﬁc advances, the Senator explained that CDC biohazard levels did not reﬂect changes
in agent classiﬁcation, genetic technology, or the emergence of new strains of organisms. See id. at S1863. Finally, Senator
Hatch emphasized that the CDC regulations did not take into account potential agent theft and did not attempt to prevent
misdirection of agents into the hands of unauthorized individuals. See id.
66Barry Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism Era, 13 Health Matrix 159, 160 (Winter 2003); see
generally Dagan, supra note 32. Agents were determined to be of “unique interest” according to their capacity to be used as
weapons. See Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism, supra at 161. The Biological Agents Bill sought
primarily to close gaps in the criminal laws that made it diﬃcult to prosecute individuals who accessed or attempted to access
pathogens for unauthorized purposes, as well as gaps in federal regulations that allowed unfettered access to the pathogens
themselves. See Dagan, supra note 32, at 553.
6718 U.S.C. § 178(1)(A)-(C); see 142 Cong. Rec. S1856 (daily ed. March 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), supra note 30, at S186218. For the CDC’s earlier deﬁnition of etiologic agent, see supra
note 32. The CDC, for its part, considered the term “etiologic agent” to be extremely similar in nature to the term “biological
agent,” noting in Appendiz C of its 1999 BMBL that “etiologic agents...[are] closely related terms that are found in the transfer
and transportation regulations” (deﬁning both biological and etiologic agent). See supra note 44.
14CDC’s regulatory authority:68
a.
Establishment of a Biological Agents List
The Biological Agents Act directed the CDC to establish and maintain a list of biological agents with the
potential to pose a severe health and safety threat to the public.69 The Act further delineated four criteria
for determining which agents warrant inclusion by the CDC on the list. First, the Act stated that the CDC
should consider the agent’s eﬀect on human health in the event of exposure.70 Second, the CDC should
note the degree of contagiousness of the agent, as well as existing methods of transmission to humans.71
Third, the CDC should evaluate the availability and eﬀectiveness of immunizations and treatments for any
illness resulting from infection.72 Finally – and perhaps most importantly for the CDC, given the concerns of
the scientiﬁc community about the inhibition of legitimate research – the CDC must consult with scientiﬁc
experts representing appropriate professional groups before placing any agent on the list.73
b.
Regulation of Transfers of Biological Agents
The Biological Agents Act also required the CDC to institute regulations for the establishment and enforce-
ment of safety procedures for the transfer of biological agents.74 According to the Act, safety procedures
68See Dagan, supra note 32, at 553. Although the language of the AEDPA refers to the Secretary of DHHS, the Secretary
delegated its authority under the AEDPA to the CDC. See Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Delegation
of Authority, 62 Fed. Reg. 15186 (March 31, 1997) (further aﬃrming or ratifying any actions taken by CDC related to the
AEDPA prior to the delegation). In addition to expanding the CDC’s role in agent regulation, the AEDPA made two important
changes to the criminal code in the area of biological weapons control. First, it amended three sections of the 1989 Biological
Weapons Antiterrorism Act to insert “genetically altered products” into the deﬁnition of biological agent, to add criminal
penalties for attempts, threats, or conspiracies to violate federal biological weapons laws, and to give the government increased
authority to seek injunctions against those who threaten to violate federal biological weapons laws. See Dagan, supra note 32,
at 554-555. Second, it amended the federal statute that criminalizes the use of weapons of mass destruction to include the use
of genetically altered biological products. See id.
69Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, §511(d)(1)(A) (codiﬁed at 42
U.S.C. §242).
70Id. at §511(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
71Id. at §511(d)(1)(B)(i)(II) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
72Id. at §511(d)(1)(B)(i)(III) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
73Id. at §511(d)(1)(B)(ii) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
74Id. at §511(e)(1) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
15included measures to ensure proper training in handling listed agents, as well as oﬃcial certiﬁcation of labo-
ratories storing and disposing of agents and related biological material.75 The Act instructed the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (“the Secretary”) to institute safeguards to prevent unauthorized access to
listed agents for terrorist or criminal purposes and procedures to protect the public in the event of an un-
lawful transfer.76 Because two competing interests were at stake – the interest of the medical and scientiﬁc
communities in accessing and shipping agents used for diagnostic purposes, and the interest of the public
in being adequately protected from attack – the Act sought to ensure that the CDC’s regulations would
strike an appropriate balance by stating that the Secretary must guarantee that agents remain available for
educational and other legitimate uses.77
In order to expedite the CDC’s regulatory mission, the Act required the CDC to establish,
within 60 days, a proposed rule.78 Final rules were to be promulgated no later than 120 days from enactment
of the legislation.79
In response to these requirements, the CDC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on June 10, 1996, based
on “the key principles of ensuring protection of public safety without encumbering legitimate scientiﬁc and
medical research.”80 The proposed rule amended existing CDC requirements for the packaging, labeling and
transport of etiologic agents, and was designed to establish a system of agent transport safeguards.81 The rule
included new measures to track the acquisition and transfer of biological agents and a process for alerting
appropriate authorities in the event of an unauthorized attempt to acquire biological material.82 More
speciﬁcally, the proposed rule provided for the development of a comprehensive list of “select agents,” deﬁned
as “those microorganism[s] (virus, bacterium, fungus, rickettsia) or toxin[s]” capable of posing a severe public
health threat and subject to regulation under 42 C.F.R. § 72, pursuant to the AEDPA. 83 The proposed rule
75Id. at §511(e)(1)(A), §511(e)(1)(B) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
76Id. at §511(e)(2), §511(e)(3) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
77Id. at §511(a)(2) (adequate protection from attack), 511(a)(4) (need for research), §511(e)(4) (agents remain available for
educational and legitimate purposes) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188); see also Dagan, supra note
32, at 556-557.
78Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act, §511(f)(1) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
79Id. at §511(f)(2) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242, later subsumed by P.L. 107-188).
80Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Infectious Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 29327 (June 10,
1996); see also Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190 (October
26, 1996) (discussing content and goals of proposed rule).
81Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190.
82Id.
83Id. at 55191.
16also provided for the registration of facilities transferring agents, veriﬁcation procedures such as audits and
quality control to ensure compliance, and agent disposal requirements, although it allowed several research
and clinical exemptions.84 During the 30-day comment period, the CDC received 67 written responses, and
over 200 comments.85 While a signiﬁcant majority of the comments requested clariﬁcation on the meaning
of words or phrases or suggested additions or deletions to the proposed list of select agents, a number focused
on the substantive requirements imposed by the regulation.86 For example, several comments questioned
the continued relevance of the CDC’s Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (“BMBL”)
manual and thus the value of incorporating it into the regulation, noting that it provided only “vague
guidelines” for the handling of agents.87 However, because the CDC believed that the BMBL served as the
only nationally and internationally recognized source for biosafety requirements for laboratories, it decided
to retain its incorporation in the rule.88 Similarly, a number of comments suggested that the CDC base
its registration procedures on models used by other entities.89 The CDC in fact reviewed models instituted
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standardization,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Institutes of Health, and the American Association for
Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care, and adapted many aspects of these models for its own system,
including, for example, on-site inspections, user fees, and registration and transfer requirements.90 Finally,
in response to several pointed comments, the CDC emphasized that it would provide oral hearings for
registration appeals, that the ﬁnal rule would not preempt other applicable federal regulations, and that the
rule was intended to apply to both intrastate and interstate shipment and transfer.91
The CDC issued its ﬁnal regulation on October 24, 1996, although the regulation did not become eﬀec-
tive until April 15, 1997.92 The regulation established the Laboratory Registration/Select Agent Program
(“Select Agent Program”) at CDC headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, and added sections 72.6, 72.7, and
Appendix A93 to 42 CFR 72. The ﬁnal regulation had several essential components:
84Id. at 55190.
85Id.
86See id.
87See id. at 55191.
88See id.
89See id.
90See id.
91See id. at 55191-55192.
92See id. at 55190.
9342 C.F.R. § 72, Appendix A lists the select agents monitored by the CDC pursuant to the rule. For a complete account of
the current contents of Appendix A, see Appendix 1 of this paper.
17a.
List of Select Agents
The ﬁnal regulation included a list of 36 “select agents” monitored by the CDC because of their potential
to cause substantial harm to human health.94 Of these 36 agents, 13 were viruses, 12 toxins, 7 bacteria, 3
rickettsia, and 1 fungi.95 Although the ﬁnal list was ultimately compiled using the criteria delineated in the
Biological Agents Act, the CDC based its list primarily on agents whose export from the U.S. was controlled
prior to the regulation due to particularly high levels of pathogenicity.96 The CDC also consulted with U.S.
military and civilian experts and members of the American Society for Microbiology in determining which
agents to include or exempt as appropriate.97 All materials known or reasonably suspected of containing a
select agent were subject to regulation.98
b.
Facility Registration
All facilities requesting or transferring select agents listed in the regulation, whether commercial suppliers,
universities, research institutions, or private individuals, were required to register with the CDC – or with
registering entities authorized by the CDC – as capable and equipped to handle biological material at the
appropriate Biosafety Level.99 Once registered, the regulations provided that each facility would receive a
94See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80, at
55199-55200. The select agent list was codiﬁed at Appendix A of 42 C.F.R. § 72.
95See id.
96The Threat of Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement
of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). For a list of
the agent criteria delineated in the Biological Agents Act, see supra page 16.
97Id.
98Id.
99Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80, at
55196; see Dagan, supra note 32, at 558; see also Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,
supra note 31, at 450, 452-453. According to the rule, registration involved (1) the provision of suﬃcient information indicating
that the applicant facility was equipped to handle agents at Biosafety Level 2, 3, or 4, depending on the agent and type of work
being performed, (2) inspection of the applicant facility at the discretion of the Secretary or the registering entity, (3) issuance
of a registration number unique to each facility, (4) collection of a periodic site registration fee, and (5) follow-up inspections
as appropiate to ensure that the facility continued to meet approved standards and recordkeeping requirements. Additional
Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80, at 55197, codiﬁed at
42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(2)(i)-(v). Registration was to be considered eﬀective until relinquished by the facility or withdrawn by the
18registration number, which had to be produced to appropriate law enforcement authorities or DHHS oﬃcals
upon request.100
c.
Agent Transfer Requirements
Under the new rule, select agents could only be transferred between registered facilities. Each registered
facility was required to complete a federally developed form – the CDC EA-101 – before transfer.101 The rule
required that the form be signed by both the transferor and the requester, as well as the responsible oﬃcials
at each facility.102 A copy of the completed CDC EA-101 was required to be kept on ﬁle by each facility
for either ﬁve years after the date of shipment or ﬁve years after the agents were consumed or disposed,
whichever was longer.103 An additional copy had to be sent to the CDC, or the appropriate registering
entity, for documentation.104 Once the transfer was set in motion, the transferring facility had to comply
with the CDC’s packaging and shipping requirements.105 Finally, the requesting facility was required to
acknowledge receipt of the agent within thirty-six hours and return a paper copy or facsimile transmission
of receipt to the transferring facility within three business days.106
d.
DHHS Secretary or registering entity. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. §72.6(a)(3). Registration could be denied on the basis of (1)
evidence that the facility was not or was no longer capable of handling covered agents at the applicable biosafety level, (2)
evidence that the facility had handled covered agents in a manner contrary to the biosafety level requirements, (3) evidence
that the facility had or intended to use agents in a manner harmful to human health, (4) evidence that the facility had not
complied with the rule, or (6) failure to pay any required registration fee. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. §72.6(a)(4)(i)-(v).
100Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, supra note 31, at 452-453.
101Id at 453; Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80,
at 55196. According to the rule, information required by the CDC EA-101 included (1) the name of the requestor and requesting
facility, (2) the name of the transferor and transferring facility, (3) the name of the responsible facility oﬃcial for the transferor
and requestor, (4) the reqesting facility’s registration number, (5) the transferring facility’s registration number, (6) the name
of the agent(s) being shipped, (6) the quantities of the agent(s) being transferred (number of containers being transferred and
amount per container), and (7) the proposed use of the agent. Id. at 55198, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(d)(1)(i)-(viii).
102Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(d)(2).
103Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(d)(3).
104Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(f)(3); see also The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the
Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 26 (1999) (prepared statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ).
105Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(f)(1).
106Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(f)(2).
19Veriﬁcation Procedures
To ensure oversight of the transfer process, each facility shipping or receiving a covered select agent was
required to designate a responsible facility oﬃcial, who had to sign each transfer request.107 Prior to
transferring an agent, the facility’s responsible oﬃcial was required to verify that the receiving institution
retained a valid, current registration, that the requestor of the agent was in fact an employee, and that the
proposed use of the agent was eﬀectively delineated.108 In the event this information could not be veriﬁed,
the responsible oﬃcial had to contact the CDC for assistance.109
The regulation authorized both the DHHS Secretary and any registering entity to conduct random or
for cause inspections of registered facilities to ensure compliance.110 If an inspection indeed occurred,
the registered facility had to produce all CDC EA-101 forms and any other records deemed relevant by
inspecting oﬃcials upon request.111 Inspections were authorized for inter- and intra-facility transfers as
well as agent disposal procedures.112
e.
Agent Disposal Requirements
The regulation required that all cultures and agents stocks be securely stored in accordance with applicable
laboratory procedures, transferred to another registered facility, or destroyed on-site by autoclaving, incin-
eration, or other approved method of disposal after use.113 The facility disposing of the agent was further
required to notify the DHHS Secretary or registering entity of the agent’s destruction.114 Formal notation
on the CDC EA-101 form was necessary.115
f.
Exemptions
The CDC regulation provided a number of exemptions. First, an agent otherwise covered by the rule was
exempt if the agent was (1) part of a clinical specimen intended for diagnostic, reference, or veriﬁcation
113Id. at 55199, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72(h)(3)(ii)(E)(i)(1)(i)-(iii).
114Id. at 55199, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72(h)(3)(ii)(E)(i)(2).
115Id.
20purposes, (2) a toxin having an LD50 for vertebrates of more than 100 nanograms per kilogram of body
weight and used for legitimate medical purposes, inactivated for use as a vaccine, or otherwise detoxiﬁed for
research, and (3) an exempted strain (i.e., a vaccine strain) pursuant to Appendix A.116 Clinical laboratories
certiﬁed under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 that use biological agents for
diagnostic, reference, veriﬁcation, or proﬁciency purposes were exempted altogether from registration and
transfer requirements.117
g.
Penalties
The new rule imposed stiﬀ penalties on violators. While individual violators would face a ﬁne of $250,000,
a year in prison, or both in the event of noncompliance, organizational violators could be forced to pay
up to $500,000 per event.118 Moreover, a fraudulent statement or representation on the CDC EA-101 – a
government form – would subject the maker of the statement to a ﬁne or imprisonment for up to ﬁve years
if the statement was by an individual, and a ﬁne if the statement was by an organization.119
The CDC noted in the promulgation of its ﬁnal rule that it did not expect facilities to incur signiﬁcant
compliance costs.120
The changes to the CDC regulation received criticism almost immediately following their adoption. In fact,
several critics questioned whether it would be eﬀective at all in limiting unauthorized access to biological
116Id. at 55198, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72(h)(1)(i)-(iii).
117Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72(h)(2). Dr. Ronald Atlas of the American Society for Microbiology explained the reasoning
behind the CLIA exemption to the Senate in 2001. According to Atlas, “there is a real diﬀerence between the research laboratory
and the clinical laboratory...the clinical laboratories don’t know when a patient comes in what they are going to isolate. They
are not necessarily pre-registered to tell you, We are going to be in possession of anthrax. And in fact under the national
laboratory network that we have established for laboratories, the local clinical lab doesn’t really accomplish the identiﬁcation
– that goes on to a public health lab or to the CDC to do. So the clinical lab may in fact be in possession, never know they
have the agent.” Germs, Toxins, and Terror, The New Threat to America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Reform of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Dr. Ronald
Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology) (responding to questions posed by Senator McConnell).
118Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80, at
55199, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 72.7.
119Id.
120Id. at 55197. According to the CDC, these costs included minimal administrative costs, such as those associated with
telephone calls, mailing, and facsimile transmission. Id. The CDC stated that it did not expect facilities to incur any capital
costs or signiﬁcantly increased operating costs. Id.
21agents and related material.121 As the critics noted, several aspects of the rule left large loopholes for
individuals or terrorist organizations determined to acquire an agent. First, the regulation applied only to
transfers of agents undertaken after the institution of the ﬁnal rule.122 Thus, past transfers that may have
left agents in the hands of unauthorized users – such as Larry Wayne Harris – were not subject to oversight.
Second, clinical laboratories, as compared to medical and research laboratories, were entirely exempted from
the scope of the rule, despite the fact that they could contain cultures of potentially dangerous agents.123
Third, the regulations covered lethal agents only.124 Less pathogenic agents – for example, salmonella –
as well as vaccine strains were left unregulated, even though many of these agents were in fact easier to
culture and capable of spreading widespread panic and illness.125 Fourth, CDC oversight did not extend
to agent culture repositories at laboratories. As the CDC stated in its ﬁnal rule, if a select agent was
stored in a repository prior to the 1997 regulation, no action was required until the agent was transferred.126
Consequently, agent theft at improperly secured laboratories remained a viable concern, and the rule did little
to encourage university and other research labs to improve inventory controls or bolster culture protection,
described by experts as “informal at best.”127 Fifth, industry experts noted that the regulation did not
address oﬀ-the-books trading of lab specimens, a common practice among researchers that accounts for some
movement of cultures between the United States and foreign countries.128 According to Dorothy Preslar,
a former head of the Biological Weapons Veriﬁcation Project for the American Federation of Scientists,
this practice left the door open for individuals to import biological material illicitly.129 Finally – and most
critically – the CDC regulations governed only transfer, not possession, of a select agent.130 Individuals who
121See id. at 55190.
122Id. at 55193.
123See supra note 117.
124Dagan, supra note 32, at 561.
125To give just two examples: (1) in 1984, the Rajneesh, an Oregon religious cult, contaminated restaurant salad bars with
salmonella bacteria, sickening at least 751 people, see W. Seth Carus, The Rajneeshees, in Jonathan Tucker, Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (2000), and (2) in 1996, twelve laboratory workers in Texas
were infected with shigella bacteria when they ate pastries left anonymously in an employee lounge, see Shellie Kolavic et al.,
An Outbreak of Shigella Dysenterie Type 2 Among Laboratory Workers Due to Intentional Food Contamination, 278 Jama
396-398 (1997).
126Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80, at
55193.
127Steve Fainaru and Joby Warrick, Access to Microbes Is Easily Obtained; Federal Oversight of Inventories Lax, The Wash.
Post, October 28, 2001, at A1.
128Id.
129Id. Fainaru and Warrick also cited Mary Gilchrist, President of the Association of Public Health Laboratories, who noted
that “some exchanges are as simple as stashing a petri dish into a lab-coat pocket before jetting oﬀ to a conference.” Id.
130The CDC explicitly excluded possessors of biological agents from the scope of its rule, despite comments indicating that
such a loophole existed. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg.
55190, supra note 80, at 55194.
22were not transferors or shippers of an agent remained free to acquire or culture agents on their own.131 Seth
Carus, a nationally recognized expert on biological warfare, described the regulations as a “paperwork drill,”
and for would-be terrorists, “a hurdle, but not a big hurdle.”132
The CDC experienced signiﬁcant implementation diﬃculties at an early stage. Although the CDC devel-
oped a computerized database to track applications, registrations, and select agent transfers, by March 1998,
nearly a year after the ﬁnal regulations became eﬀective, only 60 facilities had completed the registration
process, and none had been oﬃcially certiﬁed.133 In hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations the following May, Senator Upton emphasized that out of 300 facilities potentially han-
dling biological agents, only 120 had actually registered pursuant to the CDC rule.134 On both occasions,
the CDC claimed insuﬃcient resources as the source of its implementation failures.135 More speciﬁcally,
the CDC stated that it did not have suﬃcient funding to hire inspectors, conduct preliminary site visits,
or institute follow-up reviews.136 The resource crunch was particularly severe because the CDC decided to
retain oversight of the facility registration process, rather than delegate this authority to state registering
entities as provided in the ﬁnal rule.137 When asked pointedly by Senator Bryan to provide a letter grade
describing the adequacy of the infrastructure in place to control access to agents, Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ,
131The CDC rule did note that any individual in possession of a “biological agent or toxin...for use as a weapon,” as deﬁned
in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, would be subject to separate criminal penalties. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 175. Again, however,
the individual had to actually possess the agent for use as a weapon; possession on its own was not a crime, and proof of intent
could be a diﬃcult hurdle.
132Rochelle Sharpe, Germ Warehouse Supplies Raw Material for Research, Wall St. J. Eur., March 11, 1998, at 8.
133The Threat of Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement
of Sen. Kyl). The 60 facilities that had registered included 21 universities, 15 government agencies and 14 commercial enterprises.
V. Dion Haynes and Vincent J. Schodolski, U.S. Tries to Keep Close Tabs on Deadly Shipments, Chi. Trib., March 1, 1998,
at 4.
134The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological
Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 26
(1999) (statement of Rep. Upton).
135See, e.g., The Threat of Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control) (responding to
questions posed by Sen. Bryan); The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating
to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 106th Cong. 26 (1999) (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for
Disease Control) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Burr).
136See The Threat of Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control) (responding to
questions posed by Sen. Bryan); see id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (posing questions to Col. Franz).; see also Tony Batt, Senate
Panel Told Biological Threat Very Real, The Las Vegas Rev. J., March 5, 1998, at 1A.
137See id. (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control)
(responding to questions posed by Sen. Feinstein).
23Associate Director for Epidemiological Sciences at the CDC, responded “an A on eﬀort...and probably a D-
in resources.”138 CDC attempts to raise resource levels by implementing a user fee as part of the application
process served only to deter a majority of the 200 outstanding facilities from registering.139 During 1998
Senate Intelligence Committee hearings, several Senators chided the CDC for waiting nearly two years to
seek additional resources in the face of clear implementation failure, particularly given the importance of
the issue and the large number of laboratories that needed to be monitored.140 The CDC requested and
received $1 million in funding in its 1999 budget, but despite the monetary inﬂux, continued to ﬂounder in
its management of the agent registration program.141
Neo-nazi Larry Wayne Harris’ second arrest, on February 18, 1998, shed further doubt on the eﬀectiveness
of the CDC Select Agent Program in preventing unauthorized access to deadly pathogens.142 Harris – the
individual who inspired the drafting of the Biological Agents Act – was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada,
after an FBI informant reported that he possessed military-grade anthrax.143 Tests later conﬁrmed that the
material in Harris’ possession was only a harmless anthrax veterinary vaccine, and charges against Harris
were eventually dropped.144 Nevertheless, Harris’ arrest highlighted many of the problems undergirding
the CDC regulatory regime. First, Harris possessed a vaccine strain of anthrax, which was exempt from
the CDC’s ﬁnal rule because of its non-lethal character.145 Second, although authorities apparently could
not determine whether Harris had acquired the agent from a CDC-monitored laboratory, it was clear the
138Id. (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control) (responding
to questions posed by Sen. Bryan).
139Id. (statement of Colonel David Franz, Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command)
(responding to questions posed by Sen. Kyl).
140See id. (statement of Sen. Kyl); see id. (statement of Sen. Bryan). Senator Kyl was particularly concerned about the
CDC’s inability to eﬀectively implement its regulations, quering: “why haven’t they been implemented? what priority did you
give to the implementation and is the funding that’s ﬁnally been asked for this next budget, which presumably would go into
eﬀect in October of this calendar year, will that do the job two and one-half years after the fact?” Id. (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(posing questions to Colonel Franz).
141See The Threat of Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Sen. Kyl); See The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating
to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 106th Cong. 26 (1999) (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers
for Disease Control) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Burr, and noting that the CDC believed $1 million would ensure
proper implementation of the CDC’s regulatory mandate); see id. (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, American Society for
Microbiology) (noting, in the context of urging Congress to provide CDC with additional resources in the event of a regulatory
expansion, that CDC had not yet fully implemented its current regulations due to lack of suﬃcient funds).
142For details of the Harris arrest, see generally Anthrax Scheme Suspected, Two Men Seized in Las Vegas Include One Who
Tried to Get Plague Bacteria, Buffalo News, February 19, 1998, at A1.
143See Ex-Anthrax Suspect Gets Longer Probation, The Las Vegas Rev. J., March 25, 1998, at 8B.
144Id.
145As previously discussed, the CDC rule covered only lethal agents, despite the fact that vaccines can contain small amounts
of virile agent. See supra notes 124 and 125.
24acquisition occurred without notice on the part of the CDC or law enforcement authorities.146 Finally, even
if the CDC had successfully registered all laboratories at the time of the second Harris arrest, the CDC’s
ﬁnal rule did not require individuals like Harris, who possessed agents prior to the ﬁnal rule’s promulgation
or cultured agents on their own, to register with the CDC as possessors of a deadly biological agent.147 Thus,
Larry Wayne Harris was again squarely beyond the reach of federal regulatory power, prompting Senator
Kyl to note that three years after passage of the AEDPA, “we appear to be in the same position as we were
in 1995 with regard to the lack of controls over dangerous biological agents within the United States.”148
Following the Harris arrest, both chambers of Congress instituted a series of reviews of CDC agent controls
in an attempt to isolate the reasons behind the apparent failure of the 1996 legislation and 1997 regulations.
In early March 1998, the Senate Intelligence Committee held joint hearings with the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Terrorism concerning the threat of biological weapons. Senators in attendance chided the CDC for what
they viewed as an unacceptable delay in implementation and an ignorance of remaining regulatory gaps.149
Both Senator Kyl and Senator Bryan repeatedly questioned the CDC as to why the agency still had not
registered over two-thirds of domestic laboratories handling biological agents nearly two and a half years
after promulgating its ﬁnal rule, and insisted that the CDC quote a realistic budgetary ﬁgure for completing
its regulatory program.150 Senator Feinstein, noting that Larry Wayne Harris obtained agent cultures by
using false documentation, interrogated the CDC representative, Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, about laboratory
security procedures and employee background checks.151 Ostroﬀ, while defending the CDC’s veriﬁcation
policy, admitted that the agency did not require criminal background checks and that it would be “extraor-
dinarily diﬃcult” to deter an individual with truly criminal intent from accessing laboratory cultures.152
Several senators asked for recommendations to tighten the AEDPA and the CDC’s regulation.153 Ostroﬀ
146See generally Batt, supra note 136.
147See supra note 126; see also Dagan, supra note 32, at 560-561.
148Roger K. Lowe, Nation Lags in Protection from Biological Terrorism, The Columbus Dispatch, March 8, 1998, at 3B.
149See The Threat of Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm.on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting that “I’m very concerned...that these regulations have still not been fully implemented nearly
a year-and-a-half later”); see id (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (opining “I have the very distinct belief that as a nation we remain
ill prepared both to counter and to deter a biological or chemical attack by a clandestine perpetrator on a civilian society,” and
questioning Dr. Ostroﬀ about the existence of background check provisions and speciﬁc agents included on or missing from the
select agent list).
150See id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (further querying, in regard to the CDC regulations, “why haven’t they been implemented?
What priority did you give to the implementation and is the funding that’s ﬁnally been asked for this next budget, which
presumably would go into eﬀect in October of this calendar year, will that do the job two and one-half years after the fact?”);
see id. (statement of Sen. Bryan).
151See id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
152See id. (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control)
(responding to Sen. Feinstein’s hypothetical about a determined laboratory employee)
153See id. (statement of Sen. Shelby) (asking all three panelists what they would consider to be “the two or three most
signiﬁcant steps that Congress could take to strengthen our ability in America to prevent or to diminish the consequences
25suggested that the CDC was “open to continually reviewing the eﬃcacy of the regulations as they’ve been
promulgated,” and would consider creating safeguards to close “potential loopholes,” but stood behind its
ﬁnal rule, noting that, for example, “continuously just adding on more and more pathogens” would not give
“any additional level of assurance.”154 Attorney General Janet Reno, testifying before both committees
in April 1998, corroborated Dr. Ostroﬀ’s statement, noting that the Department of Justice was reviewing
potential legislation to strengthen agent controls but emphasizing that any additional safeguards required a
“careful balance between public safety and the requirements of legitimate scientiﬁc researchers.”155 In fact,
at the close of the joint hearings, the Department of Justice instituted interdepartmental discussions among
several executive branch agencies, including the CDC, to develop new legislative proposals in response to
the Senate’s criticism.156
In late 1998, on the heels of the Senate joint hearings, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce –
at the request of its Chairman, Representative Bliley – launched a review of the existing regulatory regime
governing the possession of biological agents.157 Concerned that the AEDPA did not make possession of a
biological agent unlawful without evidence of intent to use the agent as a weapon, the Committee began
interviewing federal oﬃcials and non-governmental policymakers in January 1999 in an eﬀort to assess the
adequacy of CDC regulations in preventing unauthorized access to agents for both benign and illicit pur-
poses.158 During the course of the interviews, several law enforcement oﬃcials and members of the scientiﬁc
community expressed concern that the CDC regulations exempted too many entities possessing or using
select agents, such as CLIA laboratories. 159 Interviewees further suggested that tightening the regulations
would advance public health and federal law enforcement goals. More speciﬁcally, the interviewees stated
of biological terrorism, if it occurs?”); see id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (questioning all three panelists about their
recommendations for tightening the biological agent laws).
154See id. (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control).
155See Biological Weapons, The Threat Posed by Terrorists: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t
Info. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Attorney General Reno) According to a report
by the House Committee on Commerce, these concerns had been raised with the Clinton Administration for several years prior
to the Committee’s oversight of the problem, but had been
“blocked by concerns raised by the CDC and HHS regarding the impact of tighter regulations on the academic and scientigic
communities.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-1047 (2001).
156See The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological
Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 15
(1999) (prepared statement of James S. Reynolds, Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department
of Justice).
157See H.R. Rep. No. 106-1047, supra note 155.
158Id.
159Id. In fact, it was estimated that approximately 150,000 CLIA labs existed in the domestic United States – providing,
theoretically, 150,000 exemptions to the CDC rule. The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the
Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 42 (1999) (statement of Rep. Burr) (questioning James S. Reynolds of the
Department of Justice).
26that the CDC regulations should be expanded to cover possession as well as transfer, ensuring governmental
knowledge of all legitimate agent users and allowing the CDC to guarantee minimum safety requirements.160
Interviewees from the Department of Justice and FBI asserted that an expanded registration scheme en-
compassing possession would serve as a potent law enforcement tool, closing the loophole that allowed
questionable possessors who did not acquire or transfer agents from a laboratory to avoid prosecution.161
The review also revealed a surprisingly slow response from the Clinton Administration to rising anxiety about
the adequacy of the CDC regulation. Despite Attorney General Reno’s 1998 testimony that the Depart-
ment of Justice recognized gaps in the federal laws pertaining to biological agent control and was “actively
reviewing legislative proposals to address [concerns with] federal criminal statutes and CDC regulations,”
President Clintons’s 1999 anti-terrorism initiatives did not include any changes in this area.162 After release
of the Clinton plan, Chairman Bliley contacted both the President and Attorney General Reno, urging the
Administration to focus on the prevention of bioterrorism by reviewing all outstanding questions related to
access and possession.163 The House Committee also notiﬁed the Administration in late April that it planned
to hold oﬃcial oversight hearings on the regulation of biological agents and eﬃcacy of CDC eﬀorts.164 The
Committee’s pressure paid oﬀ. On May 12, 1999, the Administration annouced that its omnibus crime bill
would contain provisions strengthening the existing legal regime governing the shipment and possession of
biological agents.165 Speciﬁcally, the President’s crime bill (also known as the “21st Century Crime Bill”)
included measures to bar unauthorized possession of certain highly lethal biological agents by any individ-
ual, to tighten inventory controls, and to prevent particular categories of individuals, such as felons, from
160H.R. Rep. No. 106-1047, supra note 155.
161See id.
162Id. President Clinton’s initiatives were announced on January 22, 1999. Id.
163Id. Chairman Bliley’s contacts occurred in March 1999. Id. Blilely also “reminded Attorney General Reno of her prior
testimony on this subject and inquir[ed] into the status of the Department’s legislative and regulatory proposals.” Id.
164Id.
165Id. William F. Raub, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science Policy at DHHS, testiﬁed before the House Committee on
Commerce that the President’s reasons for including the provisions were as follows: “One, although transfer of select agents
between facilities is regulated through Part 72 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the current rule does not cover
possession by facilities or individuals when no transfer is involved. Two, individuals who posses hazardous biological materials of
a type or in a quantity not justiﬁed by a peaceful purpose are a danger to society. Current statutes are insuﬃcient to discourage
such behavior. Three, an analogous concern about danger to society and limitations on current statutes exists with regard to
individuals who handle hazardous materials knowingly, recklessly, and in conscious disregard of public health and safety. Four,
a hoax or other false report regarding hazardous biological materials warrants either civil or criminal penalty, commensurate
with the act. Five, the question of who should have access to select agents in research in public health laboratories requires
careful attention.” The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous
Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th
Cong. 22 (1999) (prepared statement of William F. Raub, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science Policy, Oﬃce of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Oﬃce of the Secretary of Health and Human Services) (explaining the provisions of the
President’s omnibus crime bill).
27possessing biological agents by instituting background checks.166
As the Administration continued drafting its crime bill, the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s
Subcommitee on Oversight and Investigations went forward with its scheduled hearings on the Threat of
Bioterrorism in America: Assessing the Adequacy of Federal Laws Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents.
Convened on May 20, 1999, the hearings involved testimony from two panels of witnesses with divergent
interests. The ﬁrst panel, composed of government representatives from the DOJ, FBI, CDC, and DHHS,
unanimously expressed support for expanding CDC agent regulation to encompass posession, as well as
transfer, of highly lethal agents. While the panel noted some improvements in the CDC’s implementation of
the 1997 regulations since the 1998 Senate joint hearings – for example, the CDC was revising its laboratory
biosafety guidelines to include physical security and had begun preliminary inspections of a dozen regis-
tered facilities – it also underlined that the problem of unauthorized access to biological material remained
largely unaddressed by existing CDC rules. In the words of Representative Stupak, the regulations were
“working well for the narrow purposes for which they were intended,” but were not adequately addressing
their broader purpose of preventing bioterrorism.167 The second panel, which consisted of non-governmental
witnesses from the academic and scientiﬁc communities, conceded the need for tighter possession controls
but held fast to its assertion that regulation should not inhibit legitimate research.168 As Dr. Ronald At-
las argued, in responding to the terrorist threat, government “must minimize any adverse impact on basic
bioclinical and diagnostic research related to infectious diseases.”169 Any new legislation or expansion of
the CDC regulation, the second panel stated, must continue the delicate balancing between scientiﬁc and
public safety concerns begun with the AEDPA.170 According to several of the panelists, this goal could be
achieved by mandating increased laboratory security but leaving responsibility for compliance in the hands
166H.R. Rep. No. 106-1047, supra note 155. House Commerce Committee hearings conducted a week after the announcement
suggested that the Administration was still uncomfortable with its own proposals in this area. See The Threat of Bioterrorism in
America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 11 (1999) (prepared statement of Rep. Stupak).
According to Rep. Stupak, the proposal seemed “to require a massive new regulatory scheme that is so controversial inside the
administration that it forced major revisions in the CDC’s testimonies...and delayed receipt of the Justice Department, FBI,
and HHS testimony until close to midnight [the day before the hearings].” Id.
167Id. at 10. Chairman Bliley concurred, noting that “we permit anyone in this country – including felons, foreign nationals
from sensitive countries, and members of extremist groups – to lawfully possess even the most deadly biological agents...they
don’t even have to register with any Federal agency or gain government approval to possess them.” Id. at 5-6 (statement of
Chairman Bliley).
168H.R. Rep. No. 106-1047, supra note 155.
169The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological
Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 48
(1999) (statement of Ronald M. Atlas, Co-Chair, Task Force on Biological Weapons Control, American Society for Microbiology).
170Id. at 49.
28of individual institutions.171 The second panel also warned against instituting background checks for labora-
tory employees or restricting access to pathogens by foreign nationals, highlighting that as many as 25-30%
of all graduate students working in laboratories – and recruited for that speciﬁc purpose – were not U.S.
citizens.172
At the House hearings, the CDC was questioned for the ﬁrst time about its institutional competence as
a regulatory agency – a discussion that would later resurface during debate over the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Representative Stupak noted that the shipping regulation for
agents, revised by the CDC in 1971 and last updated in response to the AEDPA in 1997, was the ﬁrst – and
only – regulation the CDC had ever issued.173 As both Stupak and Representative Waxman underlined,
the CDC had not historically been a regulatory agency, and the CDC clearly had a strong desire, mani-
fested throughout its testimony between 1996 and 1999, to hold paramount its scientiﬁc relationship with
laboratories as legitimate research centers rather than as regulated entites.174 In suggesting development of
a new, separate agency to handle biological agent regulation, Congressman Stupak warned against placing
additional burdens on the CDC in areas where the CDC may not be properly trained.175 Representative
Waxman issued a more dire critique, stating that requiring the CDC to undertake inspection and veriﬁcation
duties, including background checks, was inconsistent with the CDC’s mission of public health surveillance
and disease prevention.176 As Waxman rightly explained, mandating that the CDC prioritize its regulatory
role forced the agency to expend fewer resources in other areas of bioterrorism prevention – like outbreak
detection – better suited to the CDC’s capabilities.177 Though defensive of its success as a regulatory body,
the CDC admitted tension between its role as a regulator and champion of public health.178 The CDC
171See, e.g., id. at 52 (prepared statement of Ronald M. Atlas, Co-Chair, Task Force on Biological Weapons Control, American
Society for Microbiology) (noting that “the DHHS/CDC, acting in cooperation with the scientiﬁc and biomedical communities,
and with public notice and input, should establish the rules and provide for governmental monitoring...however, the registered
institution must be responsible for assuring compliance with mandatory procedures and for assuring fully appropriate biosafety
mechanisms, including appointment of a responsible oﬃcial to oversee institutional compliance with biosafety requirements”).
172Id. at 67 (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Stupak).
173Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Stupak).
174Id. at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Stupak) (noting that the CDC is “a premiere, public-health research agency with no expertise
in regulatory or law enforcement,” and asserting that the CDC had a “strong desire to keep paramount its collaborative scientiﬁc
relationship with the laboratories”); see id. at 10 (prepared statement of Rep. Waxman) (stating that he feared “burdening
CDC with new regulatory duties of inspection and veriﬁcation” that would be “inimical to their collaborative work with the
research community here and abroad”).
175Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Stupak).
176Id. at 10 (prepared statement of Rep. Waxman).
177Id.
178Id. at 33 (statement of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, Centers for Disease Control). In
response to Rep. Burr’s query as to whether the CDC was “comfortable” in its new role, Dr. Ostroﬀ stated that the CDC
“[has] attempted, to the best of our abilities, to implement the regulations and carry them
forth...I think it has been obvious in some of the statements that it has not been easy for us to do this, because it is a
29speciﬁcally noted that it did not consider itself to be an inspection agency like the FDA, and stated that it
often must collaborate with the same non-governmental researchers it regulates to solve complex scientiﬁc
issues and prevent the spread of infectious disease.179 According to Dr. Ostroﬀ, the regulatory framework
developed in the 1997 ﬁnal rule “adversely impacted the longstanding working relationships” of the CDC
with members of the scientiﬁc community.180 Nevertheless, many in the scientiﬁc community actively argued
that the CDC was indeed uniquely suited to carry out its regulatory function. In his testimony before the
committee, Dr. Atlas of the American Society for Microbiology maintained that the CDC and DHHS were
the only federal entities that possessed the institutional knowledge and expertise necessary to eﬀectively
oversee the transport, storage, and use of select agents, and to correctly balance the interests of the govern-
ment in regulation and researchers in scientiﬁc freedom.181 Panelists Preslar and Connell, representing the
Federation of American Scientists and the academic community, respectively, supported Atlas’ conclusion.182
As the CDC scrambled in the ensuing months to respond to the congressional criticism, it also began a full
survey of the agents it believed should be targeted by its anti-bioterrorism eﬀorts. In June 1999, the CDC
convened a group of academic infectious disease experts, public health authorities, DHHS representatives,
civilian and military intelligence experts, and law enforcement oﬃcials to review and comment on the threat
potential of various biological agents.183 To determine an agent’s “threat potential,” the group looked to 1)
the amount of illness and death anticipated from infection with the agent, 2) the agent’s delivery potential
to large populations, 3) the level of fear and potential civil disruption associated with the agent, and 4) any
special public health preparedness needs in the event of large-scale infection, such as stockpile requirements,
enhanced surveillance, or diagnostic tools.184 The group then analyzed publicly available and classiﬁed lists
relatively nontraditional role for us to take.” Id.
179Id. at 33.
180Id. at 23.
181Id. at 49 (statement of Ronald M. Atlas, Co-Chair, Task Force on Biological Weapons Control, American Society of
Microbiology). In later testimony, Dr. Atlas asserted that “the CDC is the only federal agency with the expertise and experience
to act quickly and competently in this area. Further, and very importantly, the CDC currently possesses the conﬁdence of the
scientiﬁc community that it will act responsibly to balance the interests of preventing bioterrorism and advancing research in
the area of infectious diseases and clinical diagnostic measures.” Germs and Toxins as Domestic Terrorist Threats: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Ronald M. Atlas, President, American Society
of Microbiology).
182The Threat of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological
Agents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 63
(1999) (statement of Nancy D. Connell, Assistant Professor of Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, University of Medicine
and Dentistry of New Jersey, New Jersey Medical School) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Burr); id. (statement of
Dorothy Preslar, Federation of American Scientists) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Burr, but further noting that the
CDC should receive interagency input).
183Developing Countermeasures to Biological Attacks: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of Ali Khan, Associate Director for Science Division of Parasitic Diseases, National Center for Infectious
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
184Id.
30in an eﬀort to establish high-priority agents for regulation.185 After the meeting, CDC staﬀ attempted to
identify objective indicators that could be used to further delineate high impact agents.186 Finally, three
informal categories of agents were established based on the criteria employed by the group and the CDC
staﬀ: categories A, B, and C.187 Category A agents were those that had the greatest potential for mass
casualties and a negative public health impact, and required the most involved preparedness eﬀorts, such
as improved surveillance and stockpiling of medication.188 Category A agents also had a high likelihood of
large-scale dissemination and could cause signiﬁcant civil disruption.189 By contrast, Category B agents,
while also possessing some potential for large-scale dissemination, were those agents that caused a lesser
degree of illness and death and thus would have a lower public health impact.190 Category B agents required
fewer preparedness eﬀorts and included some agents of particular concern for the food and water supply.191
Category C was limited to those agents that did not present a high bioterrorism risk but were of possible
future concern.192 Upon completion of the categorization, the CDC chose not to amend or revise its 1997
select agent list, or to apply this “categorization” concept to the Select Agent Program.193 It did, however,
use its review framework to guide state and local preparedness programs, to determine the formulary for
its Strategic National Stockpile, and to determine reagents and protocols for the Laboratory Response Net-
work.194
With the CDC ﬁnishing its agent review, the House Commerce Committee continued to pressure the Clinton
Administration to respond to its concerns with substantial reform of existing biological agent regulations.
In an August 9, 1999 letter to Attorney General Reno, Chairman Bliley stated that he was “concerned
that we will have to wait until the actual new millennium (2001), and a new Administration, before we see
some concrete action on this front.”195 In December, the Administration sent its 21st Century Crime Bill
185Id. According to Khan, only individuals with appropriate clearance reviewed classiﬁed lists. Id.
186Id.
187Id.
188Id.
189Id.
190Id.
191Id.
192Id.
193A Westlaw search of the Federal Register from 1998-2004 returned no instances of CDC revision of its rule in response to
the critical agent review. Moreover, while the CDC did not provide a reason for refusing to revise the select agent list, it would
appear that cost considerations were a prime factor.
194Developing Countermeasures to Biological Attacks: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of Ali Khan, Associate Director for Science Division of Parasitic Diseases, National Center for Infectious
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). According to Khan, “the presence of anthrax on this list led to the
focused preparedness eﬀorts on drug stockpiles and diagnostic tests that were available during the 2001 anthrax attack.” Id.
195Bliley Blasts Reno, Administration for Failure To Address Bio-Terrorism Threats, PR Newswire, Aug. 10, 1999.
31– complete with revisions to the biological agent laws – to Congress.196 However, despite a great deal of
bipartisan support, the legislation died in committee due to strong opposition from universities, who claimed
the measures would severly restrict academic freedom.197 Several other bills introduced in the House and
Senate between 1999 and 2001 met the same fate.198 Thus, Bliley’s statement ultimately rang true: only
after the federal government was faced with the fallout from September 11, 2001, did suﬃcient momentum
emerge to ﬁnally tighten the CDC regulations.
IV.
Closing the Regulatory Gap: CDC Oversight of Agent Possession
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon highlighted America’s vulnerability
to terrorism and served as a call to arms for legislators determined to ensure the country’s physical security.
For oﬃcials concerned with the potential for a bioterrorist strike, the two months following the al-Qaeda
attacks appeared to represent the worst-case scenario, as an unidentiﬁed assailant used the United States
Postal Service to disseminate anthrax spores to media outlets, congressional oﬃcials, and ordinary citizens
along the East Coast. By the time the anthrax mailings ceased in mid-November, 5 people were dead
and another 17 infected.199 Although the source of the anthrax could not be deﬁnitively traced, the FBI
hypothesized that the spores were obtained from domestic – perhaps even federal – laboratories.200 In light of
the FBI accusations, Congress accellerated its pre-September 11 calls for an overhaul of the CDC regulations
and other laws governing the transfer and use of select biological agents.201 In fact, only six weeks after
196H.R. Rep. No. 106-1047, supra note 155. The Administration’s bill was introduced in December 1999. Id.
197Fainaru and Warrick, supra note 127, at A1.
198See, e.g., H.R. 3160, 107th Cong. (2001) (the “Bioterrorism Enforcement Act of 2001,” introduced by Rep. Tauzin);
S. 1706, 107th Cong. (2001) (the “Bioweapons Control and Tracking Act of 2001,” introduced by Sen. Harkin). Senators
Feinstein and Gregg also attempted to amend the FY 2002 Defense Department spending bill to include measures related to the
regulation of biological agents. Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, Senate Appropriations Committee Approves Feinstein-Gregg
Measure to Require Strict Certiﬁcation of Labs to Help Combat Bioterrorism (Dec. 4, 2001) (on ﬁle with the Federal Document
Clearinghouse). Although the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the amendment, the committee’s version failed in a
ﬂoor vote. See Bill Summary & Status File for P.L. 107-117, THOMAS, available at thomas.loc.gov, last visited on April 5,
2004.
199United States General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent Pro-
gram, GAO-03-315R, at 1 (Nov. 22, 2002).
200Id.
201The anthrax mailings did not provide the only signal that the CDC program was not working. For example, a February
2001 investigation by the Inspector General of the Department of Energy had revealed several microbe exchanges – including
transfers of anthrax, brucellosis, and plague – that had not been reported to the CDC as required under the 1997 regulation.
32the September 11 attacks, President Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which restricted
felons, drug users, illegal aliens, aliens from countries deemed supporters of international terrorism, and
other “persons of interest” from shipping and transporting select agents in interstate commerce purusant
to the CDC ﬁnal rule.202 However, it was not until the Public Health Security Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002 (“PHSBPRA”), which built on the restrictions imposed by the Patriot Act, that
Congress again redeﬁned the scope of CDC authority and expanded its regulatory responsibilities.
Enacted on June 12, 2002, the PHSBPRA represented a near-unanimous, bipartisan response to the per-
Similarly, another lab “had provided ‘potentially misleading information’ to the CDC about whether it was qualiﬁed to handle
certain kinds of dangerous pathogens.” Joby Warrick, ‘No One Asked Questions:’ Scientists Recount U.S. Biodefense Labs’
Security Lapses, The Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2002, at A1.
202Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
Patriot Act) Act of 2001, P.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (hereinafter, “USA Patriot Act”) § 817 (codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 175a).
The USA Patriot Act’s language speciﬁcally stated that: “(a) no restricted person described in subsection (b) shall ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or aﬀecting commerce (sic), any biological agent or toxin, or receive any
biological agent or toxin that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, if the biological agent or toxin
is listed as a select agent in subsection (j) of section 72.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to section 511(d)(l)
of the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132), and is not exempted under subsection (h)
of such section 72.6, or appendix A of part 72 of the Code of Regulations.” Id. at § 817(2)(a). The term “select agent” was
deﬁned in section to exclude “any such biological agent or toxin that is in its naturally-occurring environment, if the biological
agent or toxin has not been cultivated, collected, or otherwise extracted from its natural source.” Id. at § 817(2)(b)(1). The
term “testricted person” was deﬁned to mean (A) any individual under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding 1 year; (B) any individual convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
1 year; (C) a fugitive from justice, (D) an unlawful user of any controlled substance, (E) an illegal alien, (F) an individual
adjudicated as a “mental defective” or “committed to any mental institution,” (G) an alien who is a national of a country
deemed by the Department of State to be a supporter of international terrorism, and (H) an individual discharged from the
Armed Services of the United States under dishonorable conditions. Id. at § 817(2)(b)(2)(A)-(H). Violators of the USA Patriot
Act are subject to ﬁnes and prison terms of up to 10 years. Id. at § 817(2)(c). An amendment to the Act, oﬀered by Rep.
Scott, would have narrowed the list of persons restricted from possessing biological agents by changing the deﬁnition of persons
restricted “due to indictment for a crime,” to persons “indicted for a Federal terrorism oﬀense.” H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1
(2001). The amendment failed by voice vote. Id. Rep. Scott’s amendment would also have prohibited any alien from a country
recognized by the State Department as supporting international terrorism, as well as anyone forbidden to own ﬁrearms under
U.S. law, from possessing, receiving, or transporting a biological agent or toxin. Id. Though the “restricted user” provision of
the Patriot Act had been debated in committee several years prior to the anthrax mailings, and had even been the subject of
proposed legislation a year before its passage, many in the scientiﬁc community were caught by surprise. See, e.g., The Threat
of Bioterrorism in America, Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) (discussing
the possibility of restricting access to agents by speciﬁc groups of individuals, including felons, and noting that the President’s
21st Century Crime Bill would include measures designed to limit agent access). Speciﬁcally, according to several scientiﬁc
organizations, the Patriot Act’s “blanket restriction” on acccess to pathogens by individuals from terrorist countries working
in the U.S. may prevent scientists from undertaking work with potential public health or national security beneﬁts. Germs,
Toxins, and Terror, The New Threat to America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government
Reform of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, President, American
Society for Microbiology) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Feinstein). Representatives of the scientiﬁc community raised
these concerns in congressional hearings throughout the fall of 2001, and lobbied for a waiver to be included in the PHSBPRA.
See id. Despite academic resistance to the Patriot Act’s provisions, the CDC noted that the number of entities aﬀected by the
restriction would be limited, and the scientiﬁc community itself admitted that the burden would be “minimal.” H.R. Rep. No.
107-236, pt. 1 (2001); see also David Malakoﬀ and Martin Enserink, New Law May Force Labs to Screen Workers, 24 Science
971 (2001).
33ceived threat of biological attack as a means of mass-casualty terror in the 21st century.203 In constrast
to the 1996 AEDPA, which was designed primarily to oversee the movement of pathogens, the PHSBPRA
had a substantially broader objective: to monitor the distribution and use of agents on a national level.204
The legislation, which grew out of a DHHS bill submitted to Congress in October 2001, as well as several
independent proposals advanced in the House and Senate in October and November 2001, was designed
to tighten government supervision of agent repositories to bar unauthorized access to, and theft of, select
agents.205 Throughout the fall of 2001, congressional hearings – picking up where the House Energy and
Commerce Committee 1999 review left oﬀ – had focused on the failure of the 1997 CDC ﬁnal rule to prevent
the anthrax mailings.206 Speciﬁcally, Congress questioned whether the CDC’s regulatory regime could ever
be truly eﬀective if it did not involve oversight of agent possession, criticized the number of exemptions
available under the rule for clinical laboratories, and noted the need for better veriﬁcation measures to mon-
itor compliance.207 The PHSBPRA’s language vis-` a-vis biological agents, a compromise between competing
House and Senate versions of H.R. 3448, the legislation’s originator bill, thus sought to close many of the
loopholes identiﬁed in the AEDPA and resulting CDC regulation.208 Subsuming the provisions of the 1996
203The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594
(codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a). The House approved the legislation on May 22, 2002 on a vote of 425-1; the Senate followed
on May 23, 2002 with a 98-0 vote. Congress Approves Wide-Ranging Bioterrorism Preparedness Bill, Cidrap News, May 24,
2002, available at http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news (last visited April 5, 2004).
204Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism Era, supra note 66, at 162.
205For a legislative history of the PHSBPRA, see Bill Summary & Status File for H.R. 3448, THOMAS, available at
thomas.loc.gov, last visited on April 5, 2004, as well as The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, 107 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 188; for a concise explanation of the origins of
H.R. 3448, the legislation’s derivative bill, see Christine Kirk, H.R. 3448, Related Legislation, and the FDA’s Expanding Role
in Preventing and Responding to Biological Attack (on ﬁle with Peter Barton Hutt, Partner, Covington & Burling) (further
noting the legislation’s initial genesis in a bill supported by the Bush Administration); see also Germs and Toxins as Domestic
Terrorist Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tecnology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Claude Allen, Deputy Secretary, Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (noting that Secretary Thompson developed a draft bill to improve DHHS ability to prevent and respond to bioterrorist
threats, the “HHS Bioterrorism Prevention and Emergency Response Act of 2001,” presented to Congress for full consideration
in November 2001). For information on predecessor bills, see The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, 107 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 188.
206See, e.g., Germs and Toxins as Domestic Terrorist Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tecnology, Terrorism, and
Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001).
207See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (noting that the existing CDC registration system allowed a number of
exemptions, and questioning the appropriateness of the exemptions in light of the anthrax mailings); id. (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (highlighting the lack of a veriﬁcation process for agent disposal).
208In the words of Senator Upton, “this bill will...slam shut some gaping loopholes in our regulation of the possession of
chemical and biological agents that could be used to launch attacks.” 147 Cong Rec H9195 (statement of Sen. Upton). The
House and Senate proposed competing versions of the PHSBPRA. See Kirk, supra note 996, at 6; see also Bill Summary &
Status File for H.R. 3448, THOMAS, available at thomas.loc.gov, last visited on April 5, 2004. While the House passed its
version, H.R. 3448, on Dec. 12, 2001, the Senate insisted on a complete substitution of its bill, S. 1765, the “Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act of 2001,” into H.R. 3448 by amendment. Kirk, supra note 205, at 6. Thus, the Senate passed its amended
version unanimously on Dec. 20, 2001. Id. The diﬀerences between the two bills were eventually ironed out in committee.
See H.R. Rep. No. 107-481, 118-119 (2002); see also Bill Summary & Status File for H.R. 3448, THOMAS, available at
thomas.loc.gov, last visited on April 5, 2004.
34AEDPA, the PHSBPRA, in Title II, Subtitle A imposed new registration requirements on possessors and
users of select agents, and increased the CDC’s supervision of laboratories and other facilities possessing,
using, and transferring select agents.209 In doing so, the PHSBPRA signiﬁcantly expanded the CDC’s reg-
ulatory authority in the area of agent controls:
a.
Regulation of Certain Biological Agents and Toxins210
i.
Select Agents List
The PHSBPRA instituted a number of changes to the CDC’s oversight of its select agent list. First, the
PHSBPRA altered the criteria for determining which agents merit inclusion on the list.211 While preserv-
ing the content of the original AEDPA guidelines for classifying select agents, the PHSBPRA instituted an
additional, blanket guideline encompassing “any other criteria, including the needs of children and other
vulnerable populations, that the Secretary considers appropriate.”212 Just as the CDC was required by the
AEDPA to consult with professional groups before placing an agent on the list, the PHSBPRA directed
the CDC to consult with “appropriate Federal departments and agencies,” as well as with scientiﬁc experts
representing professional groups – including those with a pediatric focus – before ﬁnalizing its agent list.213
The CDC had to conduct, at a minimum, a biennial review of the list, and was required to republish the list
as necessary to comply with the PHSBPRA provisions.214 According to the Conference Report, the CDC
retained ﬂexibility to impose varying levels of security requirements for select agents based on their level of
threat to the public.215
209See The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594
(codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 107-481, 45. Although the language of the PHSBPRA refers to the
Secretary of DHHS, the Secretary delegated its authority under the PHSBPRA to the CDC.
211See id. at § 201(a)(1)(B)(i) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a)(1)(B)).
212Id. at § 201 (a)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a)(1)(B)(IV)). For an explanation of the factors the CDC
was required to consider when listing a select agent pursuant to the AEDPA, see supra page 16.
213Id. at § 201 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
214Id. at § 201 (a)(2) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a)(2)).
215H.R. Rep. No. 107-481, 199.
35ii.
Monitoring Possessors of Select Agents
The PHSBPRA expanded the CDC’s regulation of agent transfers to provide for the enforcement of pro-
cedures governing the possession and use of select agents, and required any entity or individual possessing
regulated pathogens to register with the CDC.216 All possessors were further required to have a legitimate
purpose in possessing, using, or transfering an agent.217 Registration involved disclosing to the CDC in-
formation regarding the agent’s “character,” including its source.218 The CDC was directed to establish a
national database of the names and locations of registered entities and individuals, as well as a list of the
agents each entity possessed, presumably to facilitate their identiﬁcation and traceability.219 The CDC was
also charged with notifying all possessors of its new mandate within 60 days of the legislation’s enactment.220
iii.
Limiting Access to Select Agents
The PHSBPRA directed the CDC to establish, in consultation with the Attorney General, speciﬁc security
requirements for registered facilities.221 These security requirements were to include measures to ensure
access only by researchers with a “legitimate need” to use or handle agents, as well as to deny access to
certain individuals, including those deﬁned as “restricted individuals” under the Patriot Act (for example,
students or researchers from countries considered sponsors of terrorism) and those “reasonably suspected
of committing Federal crimes of terrorism.”222 Registered entities were required to submit the names of
all individuals with oﬃcial access to the agent to the CDC and the Attorney General, as well as identi-
fying information for each individual.223 Once supplied with this information, the Attorney General was
216The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, §§
201(c)-(d) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(c)-(d)).
217Id. at § 201(d)(1) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(d)(1)).
218Id. at § 201(d)(2) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(d)(2)).
219Id.; see also House Committee on Energy and Commerce Section-by-Section Analysis of Public Health Security and Bioter-
rorism Response Act of 2001, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/drafts/3448section.htm.
220House Committee on Energy and Commerce Section-by-Section Analysis of Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Re-
sponse Act of 2001, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/drafts/3448section.htm.
221See The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594,
§ 201(e) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(e)).
222Id. at §§ 201(e)(2)(A) and (e)(2)(C) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(2)(A), (e)(2)(C), and (e)(2)(D)).
223Id. at § 201(e)(2)(B) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(2)(B)).
36permitted to employ criminal, immigration, and national security databases to guarantee that registered
individuals met all conditions for access, as long as the Attorney General notiﬁed the Secretary promptly of
its results.224 The CDC was required to notify registered entities promptly in the event of denial.225 The
legislation directed the CDC to include provisions for expedited review of an individual’s qualiﬁcations in its
regulations, and allowed the CDC to provide technical assistance to registered entities to improve security
and guard against the loss or theft of agents.226 In the event of loss or theft, a registered entity or individual
was required to notify the CDC and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.227 Similarly, in the
event of an agent release outside of the biocontainment area of a facility, the registered entity must contact
the CDC and Secretary, who may in turn contact law enforcement authorities, the Secretary of Agriculture,
or other federal agencies as appropriate.228
iv.
Review of Access Denial
In contrast to the AEDPA, the PHSBPRA provided for review of CDC decisions to deny an individual access
to an agent or to deny or revoke registration privileges by the Secretary.229 The legislation also allowed the
Secretary – and, if applicable, courts – to consider ex parte information if disclosure of that information
would harm national security interests.230
v.
Veriﬁcation
As in the AEDPA, the PHSBPRA authorized the CDC to inspect registered individuals or entities to ensure
compliance with CDC regulations.231
224Id. at §§ 201(e)(3)(A)-(C) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(3)(A)-(C)).
225Id. at § 201(e)(4) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(4)).
226Id. The requirements for expedited review were located at § 201(e)(5) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242a(e)(5)). Id. The
provisions regarding technical assistance were located at § 201(e)(9) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(9)). Id.
227Id. at § 201(e)(8) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(8)).
228Id. at § 201(j) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §242a(j)).
229Id. at § 201(e)(7)(i) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(7)(i)).
230Id. at § 201(e)(7)(ii) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 242a(e)(7)(ii)).
231Id. at § 201(f) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(f)).
37vi.
Exemptions
Despite strong congressional criticism of existing CDC exemptions, the PHSBPRA maintained the immunity
of clinical laboratories from the CDC rule.232 However, the PHSBPRA did narrow the CLIA exemption,
asserting that CLIA laboratories must report select agents identiﬁed during the diagnosis and veriﬁcation
process to the CDC and law enforcement authorities, and must destroy those agents pursuant to CDC regula-
tion.233 The legislation also exempted certain products containing select agents, provided the products were
cleared, approved, licensed, or registered pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Virus-
Serum-Toxin Act, or the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, or deemed “investigational”
under a Federal Act.234 Finally, the PHSBPRA allowed the CDC or Secretary to temporarily exempt an
entity or individual from compliance with the CDC regulations in the event of a public health or agricultural
emergency.235
vii.
Disclosure of Sensitive Information
232Id. at § 201(g)(1)(A)-(B) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(g)(1)(A)-(B)). Although many arguments were raised for and
against inclusion, the legislation’s exemption of CLIA laboratories appears to be largely practical. As Ronald Atlas, President
of the American Society for Microbiology, explained: “there are tens of thousands of CLIA-certiﬁed laboratories – probably
something like 150,000 diagnostic laboratories in the United States. If we begin registering all of those who don’t really possess
the agents, then I think we have a mammoth bureaucratic nightmare ahead of us that doesn’t allow us to focus the attention
where it needs to be focused.” Germs, Toxins, and Terror, The New Threat to America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Reform of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Dr.
Ronald Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Feinstein). Nevertheless,
some researchers believed that the CDC exemption was unwarranted given the goals of the regulation. David Malakoﬀ, Security
Rules Leave Labs Wanting More Guidance, 299 Science 1175 (Feb. 2003). According to Robert Newberry, a safety oﬃcer at
Clemson University, technicians at clinical laboratories face fewer laboratory-imposed restrictions on their behavior and thus
are often in the best position to divert a select agent for weapons use. Id. (further noting that the exemption was “sheer
lunacy”).
233The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, §
201(g)(1)(A)-(B) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(g)(1)(A)-(B)). Reaction to the agent disposal provision was also mixed.
As Scott Weaver, a virologist at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, noted, “requiring these labs to destroy
samples containing select agents within 7 days could hamper future scientiﬁc and criminal investigations.” Malakoﬀ, Security
Rules Leave Labs Wanting More Guidance, supra note 232 (further underlining that “our future ability to identify the source
of a terrorist introduction [depends] on having collections of reference agents”).
234The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, §
201(g)(2) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(g)(2)).
235Id. at § 201(g)(3)-(4) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(g)(3)-(4)).
38The PHSBPRA exempted from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) site-
speciﬁc or identifying information submitted pursuant to the CDC regulations concerning registered indi-
viduals or entities, agents, or laboratory security measures, and further exempted any information contained
in the CDC national database.236 This exemption did not extend, however, to disclosure of information to
Congress, or disclosure mandated pursuant to any federal law besides FOIA.237
b.
Penalties
The PHSBPRA signiﬁcantly increased civil penalties for violators: individuals caught possessing or transfer-
ring agents without registration and approval could be ﬁned up to $250,000, and entities up to $500,000.238
Similarly, a violator could be subject to up to 5 years of jail time for noncompliance.239
c.
Coordination with USDA Regulations
In distinct contrast to the AEDPA, the PHSBPRA mandated that the CDC coordinate its regulations with
USDA regulations governing the use of select agents in the development of vaccines and other products for
the treatment of domestic animals.240 The USDA regulations, which did not exist prior to the PHSBPRA’s
passage and whose establishment was thus required by the legislation, pertained solely to agents with the
potential to aﬀect animal and plant health and were intended to guard against the illicit use of agents
in agricultural terrorism attacks.241 The USDA regulations were eventually codiﬁed at 7 C.F.R. § 331
and 9 C.F.R. § 121, respectively.242 Coordination between the CDC and USDA was designed to ensure
a minimization of conﬂict and to avoid a duplication of administrative burdens for registered entities.243
236Id. at § 201(h)(1) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(h)(1)).
237Id. at § 201(h)(5)(A)-(B) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(h)(5)(A)-(B)).
238Id. at § 201(i)(1) (later codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. § 262a(i)(1).
239See Id. at § 231(b)(1), § 231(c)(1) (later codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 175(b)).
240Id. at § 221(a)(1). The USDA program was run through the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). HHS,
USDA Establish New Regulations for Use of Select Biological Agents, U.S. Newswire, December 10, 2002.
241Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002: Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed.
Reg. 76908 (December 13, 2002).
242Id.
243The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, §
39It was also intended, however, to ensure the appropriate availability of agents for legitimate biomedical,
agricultural, and veterinary research.244 The PHSBPRA envisioned a single registration process for entities
possessing or transferring an “overlap agent,” deﬁned as “any microorganism (including, but not limited to,
bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or protozoa) or toxin [posing] a risk to both human and animal health”
and subsequently listed at 42 C.F.R. § 73 and 9 C.F.R. § 121.245 Each agency was required to notify the other
in the event of an overlap application, an acceptance of registration, or a revocation or denial of access.246
Inspection and other veriﬁcation responsibilities were to be shared among the two agencies.247 Both the
USDA and CDC were to issue joint regulations no later than 18 months after enactment.248
Possessors were given 90 days to comply with the legislation and the CDC’s new
regulatory mandate.249 To expedite compliance, the CDC was required to publish an interim ﬁnal rule
no later than 180 days after enactment of the PHSBPRA, and to submit a compliance report to Congress
within the year.250 The CDC was also required to report to Congress on the actions and future plans of
the CDC with regard to its select agent list, as well as the impact of its regulation on legitimate scientiﬁc
research.251 In order to ensure improved implementation of the new rule vis-` a-vis the 1997 regulation, the
PHSBPRA appropriated an additional $3.6 million to the CDC for the 2002 ﬁscal year.252 The CDC was
also authorized to fund 21 staﬀ members under the Select Agent Program – up from 9 in the 2001 ﬁscal year
221(b)(1)-(2).
244Id. at § 221(b)(3).
245Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002: Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed.
Reg. 76908, supra note 241, at 76932.
246Id. at § 221(c)(2).
247Id. at § 221(c)(4).
248Id. at § 221(d).
249Id. at § 202(a); see also Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Possession, Use,
and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, Public Meeting, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, PowerPoint Presentation,
December 16, 2002, available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/cdc-05a.htm. The CDC published a notice in the Federal Register
on August 6, 2002, requiring all facilities in possession of select agents to notify the CDC by September 10. Notice of OMB
Approval of Data Collection, 67 Fed. Reg. 51058 (August 6, 2002); Openness vs. Security in Science Research: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Science, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of John H. Marburger, Director, Oﬃce of Science and
Technology Policy). The CDC further sent a notiﬁcation form to over 200,000 institutions for this purpose, requesting a response
regardless of actual agent possession. Id. By mid-October, the CDC had processed over 100,000 responses, with only a small
percentage declaring possession. Id. The CDC expected approximately 1,800 facilities to eventually report possession. Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and
Toxins, Public Meeting, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, PowerPoint Presentation, December 16, 2002, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/cdc-05a.htm.
250The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, §§
201(n) and §202(b)(1).
251Id. at § 201(b)(2)-(4).
252United States General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent Pro-
gram, GAO-03-315R, supra note 199, at 3.
40– primarily because program members expected their duties to increase tenfold given the large number of
entities possessing, rather than transferring, select agents.253
On August 23, 2002, the CDC published a notice of intent to issue regulations, further specifying in its notice
those agents being considered for inclusion on both the select agent and overlap lists.254 The notice invited
public comments on the CDC’s proposed list, which had been developed with input from an interagency
working group composed of representatives from DHHS, NIH, the FDA, the Departments of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, the USDA, the EPA, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, OSHA,
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the FBI, the CIA, DOJ, the DIA, and the U.S. Postal Service.255
As the CDC noted, 18 of the 36 agents included on its original select agent list were, in fact, “overlap
agents” monitored by both the USDA and CDC.256 A majority of the CDC’s changes thus reﬂected the
eventual merge of these agents into a combined USDA/CDC list of regulated viruses and bacteria.257 Other
alterations included edits in agent nomenclature and several additions/removals vis-` a-vis the original list.258
For example, the CDC recommended removal of yellow fever from the category of regulated viruses, while
adding monkeypox and Hepatitis B.259 Overall, the CDC changes would increase the number of regulated
agents from 36 to 39.
As the CDC began drafting its interim ﬁnal rule, it found itself once again at the receiving end of governmen-
tal criticism. On November 22, 2002, the U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (“GAO”) released a performance
review of the CDC Select Agent Program that highlighted major program defects and suggested several
areas for potential improvement.260 More speciﬁcally, the GAO report found “signiﬁcant management weak-
253Id. at 3-4.
254Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents, Select Agents, 67 Fed. Reg. 54605 (August 23, 2002) (revising the list of select
agents and associated genetic elements). The CDC and USDA published a list of “overlap agents” the same day. The USDA
issued its proposed list of biological agents and toxins on August 12, 2002. Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
Listing of Biological Agents and Toxins and Requirements and Procedures for Notiﬁcation of Possession, 67 Fed. Reg. 52383
(August 12, 2002).
255Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents, Select Agents, 67 Fed. Reg. 54605, supra note 254, at 54606.
256Id.
257Id.
258Id. at 54606-54607.
259Id. at 54606.
260United States General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent Pro-
gram, GAO-03-315R, supra note 199.
41nesses” in the CDC’s facility registration and transfer monitoring processes, noting that the CDC needed to
establish proper internal controls in accordance with OMB Circular A-123261 and institute changes in the
inspection and approval of registering facilities, the accuracy of its databases, and its oversight structure.262
The GAO distributed copies of its report to the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Governmental Af-
fairs, and Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, as well as the House Committees on Appropriations,
Energy and Commerce, and Government Reform.263 In response to the GAO criticism, DHHS Secretary
Thompson promised to undertake corrective action, and noted that, as the CDC instituted its new duties
under the PHSBPRA, some improvements were already underway.264 In fact, on December 6 – two weeks
after the publication of the GAO report – the CDC issued revised guidelines in the Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report.265 The revised guidelines, entitled “Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Guidance
for Laboratories Working with Select Agents,” amended the 1999 version of the CDC’s BMBL to include
measures related to risk assessment, information technology systems, personnel policies, record keeping,
emergency response, and incident reports.266 Among other recommendations, the guidelines suggested that
labs should maintain up-to-date inventories, develop transfer and shipment procedures, implement an emer-
gency response plan, and notify CDC or the USDA immediately in the event of an agent loss or release.267
Pursuant to the PHSBPRA’s mandate, the CDC published its interim ﬁnal rule on December 13, 2002.268
The rule, designed to “provide protection against misuse of select agents and toxins whether inadvertent
or the result of terrorist acts against the United States,” established detailed requirements regarding the
possession and use of select agents.269 Found at 42 CFR 73, the new rule superseded 42 CFR 72.6, which
261Oﬃce of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-123, Management Accountability and Control,
(1995). Id. As the GAO noted, this document provides the speciﬁc requirements for assessing and reporting on controls. Id.
at n.4.
262Id. at 5.
263Id. at 6.
264Id. at 5; see also Robert Roos, CDC Expands Security Guidelines for Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens, December 6,
2002, available at http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/selagents.html.
265Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Guidance for Laboratories Working with Select Agents,
51 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rpt. RR-19 (2002); see also Robert Roos, CDC Ex-
pands Security Guidelines for Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens, December 6, 2002, available at
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/selagents.html.
266For information concerning the CDC’s BMBL, see supra note 36. While the previous version of the guidelines primarily
addressed physical security measures to prevent theft of select agents, the new version broadened the CDC’s recommendations to
include risk assessment, information technology systems, personnel policies, record-keeping, emergency response, and reporting
of incidents, as well as access control. Robert Roos, CDC Expands Security Guidelines for Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens,
December 6, 2002, available at http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/selagents.html.
267See id.
268Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76886 (December 13, 2002). The USDA published
its interim rule on the same day. HHS, USDA Establish New Regulations for Use of Select Biological Agents, supra note 240.
269Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76886, supra note 268.
42was instituted by the CDC in its 1997 rulemaking.270 The rule applied primarily to academic institutions
and biomedical centers, the pharmaceutical industry, federal, state, and local laboratories, and research fa-
cilities, and served to inform the scientiﬁc community at large of its new duties under the PHSBPRA.271
The changes to the CDC’s oversight duties were signiﬁcant:
a.
Select Agent List
The CDC’s interim ﬁnal rule expanded the number of regulated agents from 36 to 39.272 The 39 regulated
agents included 20 HHS select agents and 19 “overlap” agents.273 Of the 20 HHS select agents, 9 were
viruses, 3 bacteria, 1 fungi, and 7 toxins.274 The “overlap” agent list was composed of 4 viruses, 9 bacteria,
1 fungi, and 5 toxins.275 In contrast to the 1997 CDC regulation, both lists excluded agents or toxins in
their naturally occurring environments from oversight, provided the agent was not intentionally collected,
cultivated, or otherwise extracted from its natural source.276 The lists also allowed exemptions for vaccine
or otherwise “attenuated” strains upon a determination by HHS or the USDA, respectively, that the agent
strain did not pose a severe threat to the public health.277
b.
Registration
Pursuant to the PHSBPRA’s mandate, the CDC interim ﬁnal rule introduced registration requirements
for possessors of select agents.278 As the CDC explanatory note stated, an entity could not possess, use,
270Id.
271Id. at 76895.
272This number was reached by comparing the agents listed in Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving
Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 80, at 55199-55200 (codiﬁed at Appendix A of 42 C.F.R. § 72) with the agents
listed in Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76886, supra note 268, at 76898-76899
(codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R § 73.4 and 42 C.F.R. § 73.5).
273See id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R § 73.4 and 42 C.F.R. § 73.5.
274Id. at 76898, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.4(a)-(e).
275Id. at 76898-76899, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.5(a)-(e).
276Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.4(f)(1) and 42 C.F.R. § 73.5(f)(1).
277Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.4(f)(5) and 42 C.F.R. § 73.4(f)(5).
278See generally id. at 76900, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(a).
43transfer, or receive any select agent – even from a laboratory outside of the United States – unless the
entity registered with the CDC.279 Registration involved receiving an application number from the CDC and
submitting detailed identiﬁcation information, as articulated in the PHSBPRA, to the CDC and Attorney
General.280 An entity’s registration was only valid for the speciﬁc select agents listed in its application, as
well as for the activities and location reported to the CDC, although an amendment process was available.281
A certiﬁcate of registration was deemed valid for only three years, and to obtain a new certiﬁcate, an entity
was required to submit a new application.282 The CDC retained broad oversight and revocation powers, and
could terminate an entity’s registration for failure to comply with any of the interim fnal rule’s provisions.283
Upon termination of an entity’s registered status, the entity was required to destroy or dispose of all select
agent cultures according to prescribed HHS standards.284
c.
Laboratory Security
In direct contrast to the 1997 rule, the new interim rule provided detailed measures for laboratory security.
An entity could not provide employee access to select agents unless each employee had been approved by
the CDC as capable of safely handling the agent at the appropriate Biosafety level and had been subject
to a risk assessment by the Attorney General.285 Once granted, CDC approval to handle select agents was
279Id. at 76886.
280Id. at 76900, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(b)(1)-(2). The CDC rule lists an entity’s “registering information” as 1) the
entity’s name, address, contact numbers, and identiﬁcation number as assigned by the Attorney General 2) the name, source,
and characterization of the select agent or toxin included in the entity’s registration, as well as the quantity held at the time
of registration, 3) the location, including building and room number, where each agent or toxin will be stored at the entity,
complete with applicable ﬂoor plans, 4) information addressing safety, security, emergency response plans, and training at the
entity, 5) the name, position, and identiﬁcation information for the entity’s responsible oﬃcial, 6) a list of all individuals needing
access to the agent or toxin, and 7) a certiﬁcation by the responsible oﬃcial attesting to the application’s honesty and accuracy.
Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(b)(2)(i)-(vii). The CDC also reserved the right to consider “any other information necessary
for the determination.” Id. at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(b)(2)(viii).
281Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(d)-(e).
282Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(g).
283Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(g)(1)-(2).
284Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.7(g)(2) and § 73.7(h).
285Id. at 76901, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.8(a). For a discussion of the adoption of the background screening requirement, see
H.R. Rep. No. 107-481, 120-121 (2002), as well as The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, § 201(e)(1). The CDC rule stated that to obtain a security risk assessment, a
registering entity must submit to the Attorney General its registration application, as well as any other information requested
by the Attorney General for the entity, its responsible oﬃcial, any individual controlling the entity, or individuals working with
the agent. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76886, supra note 268, at 76901, codiﬁed
at 42 C.F.R § 73.8(c)-(d). The Attorney General later delegated its risk assessment authority to the FBI. Possession, Use, and
Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 68 Fed. Reg. 62245 (Nov. 3, 2003). The Criminal Justice Information Services Division
(CJIS) is the FBI component responsible for implementing the assessment program. Id.
44eﬀective for ﬁve years, although the CDC could grant shorter terms when necessary or expedient.286 As the
PHSBPRA mandated, the CDC included in its interim rule procedures for expedited review.287 As in its
earlier 1997 rule, each registering entity was required to designate a responsible oﬃcial with the authority to
ensure compliance with the CDC regulation.288 Registering entities were required to develop and implement
a safety plan, a security plan, and an emergency response plan, and the entity’s responsible oﬃcial was
to conduct regular inspections to guarantee their eﬀectiveness.289 The security plan, in particular, was to
be reviewed at least annually.290 Entities were directed to ensure that only approved employees received
unescorted access to areas containing select agents and toxins, and were to require the inspection of all
packages entering and exiting the area.291 Each facility was required to establish a protocol for intra-entity
transfers, as well as develop procedures for the rapid reporting of an agent theft, loss, or release, or other
inventory compromise.292 Similarly, each facility was to provide regular and proper training for all employ-
286Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76886, supra note 268, at 76901, codiﬁed at 42
C.F.R. § 73.8(f).
287Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.8(g).
288Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.9(a). According to the CDC rule, the facility’s responsible oﬃcial may identify one or more
individuals to serve as “alternate responsible oﬃcials” when the respondible oﬃcial is unavailable to complete his duties. Id.
Under the rule, the responsible oﬃcial is required to ensure compliance with all aspects of the CDC’s regulation, including (1)
developing and implementing safety, security, and emergency response plans, (2) allowing only approved individuals to have
access to select agents and toxins, (3) providing appropriate training, safety, security, and emergency response, (4) transferring
select agents and toxins, (5) providing timely notice of agent theft, loss, or release, (6) maintaining detailed records of information
necessary to give a complete accounting of all activities related to select agents or toxins, and (7) reporting the identiﬁcation of
a select agent or toxin as a result of diagnostic, veriﬁcation, or proﬁciency testing. Id at 42 C.F.R. § 73.9(c)(1)-(7). According to
the CDC rule, the facility’s responsible oﬃcial may identify one or more individuals to serve as “alternate responsible oﬃcials”
when the respondible oﬃcial is unavailable to complete his duties. Id., codiﬁed at § 73.9(a).
289Id. at 76901-76903, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.10(a) (safety plan), 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(a) (security plan), 42 C.F.R. § 73.12
(emergency response plan), 42 C.F.R. § 73.10(b) (inspections related to eﬃcacy of safety plan). According to the rule, the
facility’s safety plan was to be based on the CDC BMBL guidelines. Id. at 76901-76902, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. §73.10(a)(1)-(2).
The facility’s security plan was to (1) describe inventory control procedures, minimal education and experience criteria for
individuals with agent access, and physicial security measures, (2) contain provisions for routine cleaning, maintenance, and
repairs, provisions for training personnel in security procedures, provisions for securing the area where the agent is stored, and
protocols for altering locks and staﬀ access in the event of personnel change, (3) describe procedures for loss or compromise of
keys and passwords, (4) contain procedures for reporting suspicious persons or activities, loss, theft, or release of listed agents
or toxins, or alteration of inventory records, (5) contain provisions for the control of access to containers where listed agents and
toxins are stored, (6) contain provisions for ensuring that all individuals with agent access understand security requirements
and are trained to follow established procedures, (7) contain procedures for reporting and removing unauthorized persons, and
(8) establish speciﬁc procedures for securing the area where agents are stored or researched when individuals unapproved for
access under 42 C.F.R. § 73.8, supra note 285, are present. Id. at 76902, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(b)(1)-(8). A facility’s
emergency response plan was required to apply to such events as bomb threats, severe weather, earthquakes, power outages,
and other natural disasters. Id. at 76903, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.12(b). The plan was to further address (1) the hazards
associated with the use of select agents or toxins, (2) any hazard associated with response actions that could lead to the
agent’s spread, (3) planning and coordination with outside parties, (4) personnel roles, lines of authority, and training and
communications, (5) emergency recognition and prevention, (6) safe distances and places of refuge, (7) site security and control,
(8) evacuation routes and procedures, (9) decontamination, (10) emergency medical treatment and ﬁrst aid, (11) emergency
alerting and response procedures, (12) critique of response and follow-up, (13) personal protective and emergency equipment,
and (14) special procedures to address the hazards of speciﬁc agents. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.12(c)(1)-(14).
290Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(c).
291Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(d)(1)-(4).
292Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(d)(5) (intra-entity transfers) and 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(d)(7)(i)-(v) (reporting procedures).
45ees or other individuals handling select agents.293 If an employee had been working with select agents for
a lengthy period of time prior to the regulation, the responsible oﬃcial could certify in writing that the
employee possessed appropriate knowledge and skills in lieu of attendance at training sessions.294 Registered
entities were ordered to separate areas where select agents and toxins would be stored or used from public
areas of the building.295 Finally – and perhaps most controversially – prior HHS approval was required for
all experiments involving recombinant DNA that might result in a higher level of agent toxicity or drug
resistance.296
d.
Agent Transfers
Transfer requirements remained largely the same under the new interim rule, with one signiﬁcant diﬀerence:
prior approval had to be received from either the CDC or USDA (if the agent at issue was an “overlap”
agent) before undertaking any agent transfer.297 The regulation additionally required a recipient facility to
notify the HHS Secretary if the select agent was not received within 48 hours of the expected delivery time,
or if the package containing the agent was leaking or damaged.298 A recipient facility was also required to
report an agent’s destruction or use to the HHS Secretary within 5 days of such action.299
293Id. at 76903, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.14(a)-(c).
294Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.14(d).
295Id. at 76902, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.11(e).
296Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.10(c)(1)-(2). Government-funded scientists were already subject to such a restriction under
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) guidelines. David Malakoﬀ, New U.S. Rules Set the Stage for Tighter Security, 298
Science 2304 (Dec. 20, 2002). While some scientists believed expanding the NIH guidelines to all researchers under the CDC
rule was a good idea, see id. (biochemist Richard Ebright of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, noting that the review list
should include experiments that could lead to less eﬀective vaccines or improve methods of producing bioweapons and further
suggesting that “it’s common sense that such work get stricter scrutiny”), others felt that the CDC was entering dangerous
territory. According to Ronald Atlas, President of the American Society for Microbiology, the CDC regulation raised several
concerns. First, because the CDC’s oversight was codiﬁed via regulation rather than guideline, changes in the oversight process
would be much more diﬃcult to aﬀect. Atlas wasn’t sure that “the government should start proscribing experiments...and
locking rules into regulations,” and noted that guidelines are more ﬂexible and can be easily adjusted to changing circumstances.
Id. Second, Atlas and other researchers highlighted that the regulation was silent as to who at the CDC would review sensitive
experiments. Id. While the NIH conducted most oversight reviews in public, researchers noted, secrecy could be deemed
important in an area with signiﬁcant implications for national security. Id. If so, one anonymous scientist pointed out, “there
is going to be an issue around transparency.” Id.
297Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76886, supra note 268, at 76903, codiﬁed at 42
C.F.R § 73.14(d).
298Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.14(g).
299Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.14(h).
46e.
Records
The interim rule imposed, for the ﬁrst time in regulatory history, signiﬁcant inventory controls on register-
ing facilities. According to the rule, a facility’s responsible oﬃcial was required to maintain an up-to-date,
accurate list of individuals approved for agent access, a current inventory of each select agent held in an
on-site repository or in the facility’s possession, a record of every agent access by an employee, and a record
of all inspections, safety, security, and emergency response plans, trainings, transfer documents, and incident
reports.300 Facilities were required to retain records for a minimum of three years.301
f.
Veriﬁcation Measures
The interim rule aﬀorded greater authority to the CDC to conduct inspections. In fact, the CDC was given
blanket inspection control, and could enter a facility unannounced with or without cause.302
g.
Notiﬁcation
300Id. at 76903-76904, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.15(a)-(i). More speciﬁcally, inventory records were required to include (1) the
agent’s name, characteristics, and source data, (2) the quantity of agent held on the date of the ﬁrst inventory, (3) the quantity
of agent acquired, the source, and the date of acquisition, (4) the quantity, volume, or mass destroyed or disposed of, and the
date of each such action, (5) the quantity used and the dates of such use, (6) the quantity transferred, the date of transfer,
and the individual to whom it was transferred, for both inter- and intra-entity transfers (7) the current quantity of agent or
toxin held, (8) any agent or toxin lost, stolen, or otherwise unaccounted for, and (9) a written explanation of any discrepancies.
Id. at 76903, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.15(b)(1)-(9). For select agents or toxins accessed, the facility was required to retain
records of (1) the name of each individual who accessed the select agent, (2) the select agent or toxin used, (3) the date when
the select agent or toxin was removed, if removed from long-term storage, (4) for toxins, the quantity removed, (5) the date the
select agent or toxin was returned to long-term storage, and (6) for toxins, the quantity returned. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. §
73.15(c)(1)(i)-(vi). For access to the storage area for select agents or toxins, the facility was required to retain records of (1)
the name of each individual who accessed the area, (2) the date and time the individual entered the area, (3) the date and
time the individual left the area, and (4) for individuals individuals unapproved for access under 42 C.F.R. § 73.8, supra note
285, the individual approved under 42 C.F.R. § 73.8 who accompanied the individual into the area. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R.
§ 73.15(c)(2)(i)-(iv).
301Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.15(j).
302Id. at 76904, codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.16; see also Malakoﬀ, New U.S. Rules Set the Stage for Tighter Security, supra
note 296.
47As mandated by the PHSBPRA, a registering entity was required to notify the CDC and federal, state, and
local law enforcement authorities in the event of an agent theft, loss, or release, regardless of whether the
agent is eventually recovered.303
h.
Administrative Review
The interim rule allowed registering entities to obtain review of decisions denying or revoking a certiﬁcate
of registration or denying or revoking approval to handle an agent, provided that such review was requested
within 30 days of the initial agency action.304 Where the agency decision was rendered by the Attorney
General pursuant to its risk assessment authority, the Attorney General was given responsibility to conduct
the review, with notiﬁcation of the decision forwarded to the DHHS Secretary.305 The DHHS Secretary del-
egated its authority to conduct compliance inspections and impose civil monetary penalties to the Inspector
General of DHHS, and further delegated the ability to conduct hearings and render decisions with respect
to monetary penalties to the DHHS Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”).306
The interim ﬁnal rule became eﬀective on February 7, 2003.307 After publication of the rule, the CDC
requested written comments, which had to be received prior to February 11, 2003 in order to be considered
by the CDC in its drafting of the ﬁnal rule.308 The CDC held a public forum on December 16, 2002 on
the Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, and invited regulated entities and other
interested parties to orally comment on the interim rule.309 At the forum, representatives from the Select
303Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.17(a)-(b) (agent loss or theft) and 42 C.F.R. § 73.17(d) (agent release). When reporting a
theft or loss, an entity must provide (1) the name of the select agent or toxin and related identifying information, (2) an estimate
of the quantity lost or stolen, (3) an estimate of the time during which the left or loss occurred, (4) the location, including the
building or room number, from which the theft or loss occurred. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.17(c)(1)-(4). When reporting
an agent release, an entity must provide (1) the name of the select agent or toxin and related identifying information, (2) an
estimate of the quantity released, (3) the time and duration of the release, (4) the environment into which the release occurred,
(5) the location from which the release occurred, (6) the number of individuals potentially exposed at the facility, (7) actions
taken to respond to the release, and (8) hazards posed by the release. Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. §73.17(e)(1)-(8).
304Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.18.
305Id.
306Id., codiﬁed at 42 C.F.R. § 73.19(a) (Inspector General) and 42 C.F.R. § 73.9(b) (DAB).
307Id. at 76886.
308Id.
309HHS, USDA Establish New Regulations for Use of Select Biological Agents, supra note 240; see also U.S. Department of
Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Meeting on the Interim Final Rule for Select Agents,
December 16, 2002, available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/.
48Agent Program explained the registration and risk assessment deadlines instituted by the interim ﬁnal rule,
and noted that all entities possessing, using, or transferring select agents were required to be in full compliance
by November 12, 2003.310 Despite the imposition of a large number of new requirements, the CDC stated
that it did not believe the rule would pose a signiﬁcant burden on regulated entities, as the agency expected
that a great majority were already in compliance.311 Nevertheless, many facilities possessing select agents
quickly complained that the CDC registration timeline was not realistic and would in fact disrupt laboratory
work.312 Moreover, a number of entities complained that the CDC’s rule, particularly the physical security
provision, was too stringent for laboratories handling lower-risk select agents at Biosafety Level 2 or 3.313
Because the regulations could force regulated entities to build separate facilities in order to comply with the
safety and security requirements – an expensive prospect – commenters argued that the rule would greatly
impede legitimate research.314
Written comments submitted over the next two months mirrored the concerns raised at the CDC public
forum. According to a majority of the over 100 comments, many elements of the CDC’s rule were “vague,
confusing, and possibly counterproductive.”315 As the American Society for Microbiology noted, the rules
“require[d] a large number of activities in a short period,” resulting in start-up compliance costs of up to
310Id. (statements of Dr. Stephen Ostroﬀ and Mr. Sparks).
311Id.
312Id. (statement of Ronald Atlas, President of the American Society of Microbiology) (noting that “although the regulation
includes a phase-in or transition period for a number of requirements, it’s not clear to us that we’re really going to be able to
meet all of the requirements in time to keep the laboratories functioning”); see also id. (statement of Michael Durham, Director
of Occupational and Environmental Safety, Louisiana State University) (stating that the “new regulations issued go too far in
too short a period of time” and recommending that “the timetable be adjusted so that we’ll be able to achieve it”). The CDC’s
proposed timeline can be found in Appendix 2 of this paper; see also David Malakoﬀ, Security Rules Leave Labs Wanting More
Guidance, supra note 232 (quoting the American Society of Microbiology, who stated that the rules “require a large number of
activities in a short period”).
313U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Meeting on the Interim Final
Rule for Select Agents, December 16, 2002, available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/ (statement of Michael Durham, Director
of Occupational and Environmental Safety, Louisiana State University) (asserting that
“the regulations be modiﬁed to reﬂect the actual gravity of the various agents and toxins and the likelihood of harm occurring
from each”); see id. (statement of Emmett Barkeley, Director of the Oﬃce of Laboratory Safety, Howard Hughes Medical
Institute) (stating that the “security and the security and emergency response provisions are too stringent for select agents and
toxins not mandated for control within maximum containment facilities”).
314Id. (statement of Michael Durham, Director of Occupational and Environmental Safety, Louisiana State University) (noting
that the new security measures “were probably going to limit the number of locations and institutions where this research can be
performed,” in turn “immediately reducing the creativity and research that will impede the accumuldation of knowledge”); see
also Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes At Labs’ Doors, N.Y. Times, August 13, 2002, at F1 (noting that “many institutions
are planning to build new high-security laboratories – bucking a trend toward open spaces that encourage scientists to share
knowledge and materials – or throw up new walls in existing labs”).
315David Malakoﬀ, Security Rules Leave Labs Wanting More Guidance, supra note 232, at 1175. Full-text versions of the
submitted comments can be accessed at www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docket.htm.
49$700,000 per lab and forcing facilities to focus on adherence to the rule rather than research.316 The Society
further complained that the provisions requiring that facilities notify the authorities even if they have no select
agents were unnecessarily burdensome.317 Lab administrators appeared particularly concerned about the
mandatory employee background checks. CDC oﬃcials estimated that as many as 20,000 researchers at nearly
1000 laboratories would have to be screened pursuant to the rule before being authorized to access select
agents, but highlighted that the regulation avoided a blanket ban on foreign scientists and gave the Secretary
some discretion over potential waivers.318 Nevertheless, many labs – especially academic institutions – felt
restrictions on access violated their scientiﬁc mission. For example, in reviewing the CDC rule, a faculty
committee at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology argued that security clearances for students and
limitations on agent access were “not consistent with MIT principles” and recommended that MIT consider
refusing campus work on select agents.319 While no other lab to date has taken MIT’s position, several have
insisted that the CDC reevaluate its position concerning unauthorized access, particularly because researchers
working on a wide range of experiments often share space and equipment.320 One recommendation, put forth
by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute of Chevy Chase, MD, would have allowed laboratories to develop
systems to limit access to select agents, for instance by storing agents in locked freezers, without barring
all unscreened workers from the area where select agent research was undertaken.321 Isolating materials
rather than researchers would thus limit the number of background checks needed while decreasing the cost
of compliance for both the government and the labs.322 The provision that received the greatest criticism
was the CDC’s requirement that scientists receive prior approval for genetic experiments that could increase
agent toxicity or drug resistance. Although federally-funded scientists were already subject to a similar
316Id.; see also David Malakoﬀ, New U.S. Rules Set the Stage for Tighter Security, supra note 296.
317Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes At Labs’ Doors, supra note 314, at F1. Barry Kellman further underlined this criticism,
noting that “every laboratory must scour through its freezers and other storage sites for such items lest they materialize
unexpectedly” and that for many laboratories, “collections of pathogens are improperly labeled, complicating the task of
conducting a complete inventory.” Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism Era, supra note 66, at 163.
In fact, Kellman argued that prior to the regulation, only a conscious decision to transfer a select agent invoked a regulatory
obligation, while the new obligation applied to every agency regardless of an entity’s choice in structuring its actions. Id.
318David Malakoﬀ, Security Rules Leave Labs Wanting More Guidance, supra note 232, at 1175; see also 42 U.S.C. §262(e).
319Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes At Labs’ Doors, supra note 314, at F1. In hearings before the House Subcommittee
on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Reform, Ronald Atlas, President of the American Society for Microbiology, argued
that this reaction was precisely what government regulation should have sought to avoid. According to Atlas, “we need the
researchers to ﬁnd the vaccines and the pharmaceuticals. If we...do not have legitimate researchers doing research on anthrax,
we will not have the drugs and the vaccines in the future to combat any bioterrorist attack. Much of that research goes on at
our universities, as well as in the federal labs and other industrial laboratories. That’s absolutely critical to the welfare of the
nation.”Germs, Toxins, and Terror, The New Threat to America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism,
and Government Reform of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, President,
American Society for Microbiology) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Feinstein).
320David Malakoﬀ, Security Rules Leave Labs Wanting More Guidance, supra note 232, at 1175.
321Id.
322Id.
50restriction under National Institutes of Health guidelines, many in the scientiﬁc community believed that
converting ﬂexible guidelines to an inﬂexible rule would hinder scientiﬁc advances and detrimentally eﬀect
public health in the long run.323
As with the CDC’s 1997 regulation, comments expressed doubts that the new CDC measures – designed
precisely to close gaps that allowed unauthorized access to agents – would actually prevent access to biological
materials by dedicated terrorists. According to the commenters, many of the cultures “going under lock and
key at great expense,” such as Ebola or plague, were in fact freely available in countries with natural
outbreaks.324 Moreover, most of the 1500 culture collections around the world could provide select agents
to researchers with very few restrictions or controls.325 Thus, in the absence of an international agreement
criminalizing bioterrorism or a harmonization of transfer and shipment requirements across borders, the
CDC regulation, it was argued, was likely to have little impact.326 In the words of one critic, “it doesn’t do
us a lot of good to tighten our national regulations over the exchange or possession of agents if one can go to
another country and simply obtain them.”327 Similarly, commenters noted that the new regulation did not
address concerns over the publication of research related to select agents.328 On the one hand, restrictions
on the publication of scientiﬁc research raise serious First Amendment concerns and likely hinder the type
of information sharing critical to advances in vaccines and pharmaceuticals.329 On the other hand, detailed
323See supra note 296.
324Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes At Labs’ Doors, supra note 314, at F1. John Parachini, a policy analyst at the
RAND Corporation, explained this concern in further detail before the Senate. According to Parachini, “Aum, the Japanese
cult group, actually did go to Zaire thinking that they could acquire some Ebola virus. Now, they went in a period where there
were not actually outbreaks. But they thought about it. So they did exactly that. And it may be more diﬃcult to actually
monitor who is going in and out of hot zones where there are emerging infectious diseases, as opposed to laboratories, where
we know where they are – for example in the former Soviet Union – and can focus our attention in improving the security. We
should do that. But we should also be aware of this more elusive source that pops up around the world according to its own
design, and that it’s hard to anticipate where it is.” Germs, Toxins, and Terror, The New Threat to America: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Reform of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of John Parachini, RAND Corporation) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Feinstein).
325Id. (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology) (responding to questions posed by Sen.
McConnell). John Parachini reiterated this danger in Senate hearings prior to the passage of the PHSBPRA. According to
Parachini, “we should be aware that [in] other places, there’s not near the accountability as we have in this country, and this
problem may be global in scope; indeed, the Ames strain of anthrax has been sent around the world for years. So even if we
get our own house in order, which is not an easy task, we’ve got another sort of circle of challenge before us.” Id. (statement
of John Parachini, RAND Corporation) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Kyl).
326See id. (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, President, American Society for Microbiology) (responding to questions posed by
Sen. McConnell).
327Id. Atlas also noted that “it does us, I think, little good to know who possesses agents within the United States if we don’t
similarly know who possesses those agents around the world.” Id.
328Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes At Labs’ Doors, supra note 314, at F1. According to one news source, the concept
of publication restriction in scientiﬁc journals did surface in a Defense Department draft proposal which would have given the
government signiﬁcant control over the publications, speech and travel of scientists who accepted Pentagon research money. Id.
The proposal, which concerned academics, is purportedly being reconsidered. Id.
329Id.
51discussion of agent research could prove useful to would-be terrorists in producing biological weapons.330
According to one analysis, abstaining from publishing results is “unthinkable” for researchers “bred on the
publish-or-perish culture,” particularly when intellectual exchange allows researchers to “do better science,
to make better conclusions.”331 Yet as Dr. Gerald Epstein of the Institute for Defense Analysis asserts,
“unleashing a highly lethal biological agent [would be] an unparalleled disaster for humanity.”332 To date,
the debate over speech restrictions for scientiﬁc research involving biological agents has not been deﬁnitively
decided.
The comments’ concerns about the tight CDC compliance deadline proved accurate. On November 3, 2003,
the CDC amended its interim ﬁnal rule, primarily to allow for the issuance of provisional registration certiﬁ-
cates, as well as provisional access grants, for all entities who submitted information to the Attorney General
for a risk assessment prior to the amendment’s date.333 Because the CJIS – the FBI division administer-
ing the risk assessments – had diﬃculty processing the thousands of assessment requests received between
February 7 and the November 12 regulatory deadline, holding all facilities with outstanding applications in
violation of the rule would have shut down a large portion of the research sector.334 As the CDC noted, “the
continued operation of these facilities is vital to the public interest;” thus the purpose of the amendment was
to ensure that “both ongoing and new research and educational eﬀorts” important to national defense were
not disrupted.335 According to the amendment, the provisional registration and access certiﬁcates would
stay in eﬀect until the HHS Secretary either granted or denied an individual or entity’s formal application.336
The CDC has yet to publish a ﬁnal rule, and has not disclosed a timeline for doing so.
330Id. The dispute over the publication of scientiﬁc research with a potential to aid weapons development emerged with
intensity in December 2000, when a team of Australian scientists published the results of a study designed to create a getically
engineered virus to combat the overpopulation of mice. Jon Cohen, Designer Bugs, 290 The Atlantic Monthly 113-124
(2002), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/07/cohen-j.htm. In the course of their study, the scientists had
discovered a mechanism that could increase the pathogenicity of a number of human diseases, creating, in eﬀect, “superbugs.”
Id. For an excellent account of the incident and the issues surrounding academic freedom and dual-use technology, see id.
331Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes At Labs’ Doors, supra note 314, at F1. Similarly, Ronald Atlas stated that “censoring
bits of research erodes the very bedrock of science: the ability of other scientists to replicate results.” Leaving out data, he
noted, is “not new to cryptographers and not new to physicists, but it’s new to biologists; biologists have never seen this before.”
Id.
332Id.
333Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 68 Fed. Reg. 62245, supra note 285.
334Id. at 62245-62246.
335Id. at 62446.
336Id.
52V.
The CDC Under Attack: Attempts to Move CDC’s Regulatory Authority to the Department of Homeland Security
In the midst of the CDC’s reaction to the changes in its authority brought about by the PHSBPRA, criticism
concerning the CDC’s regulatory competence – ﬁrst oﬀered in 1999 congressional hearings in response to
the CDC’s diﬃculties in implementing its 1997 rule – reemerged with signiﬁcant bite. On June 24, 2002,
only 10 days after President Bush signed into law the PHSBPRA, the Bush Administration introduced its
Homeland Security Bill to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security.337 Designed to “provide for
the security of the American people, territory, and sovereignty” by “uniting under a single department”
those federal elements involved in national defense, the Homeland Security Bill proposed transferring several
HHS functions, including the CDC Select Agent Program, from DHHS to a newly-created Department of
Homeland Security.338 Under the Bill’s provisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security would administer the
Select Agent Program “in consultation” with the CDC.339 While ultimate decisionmaking and administrative
authority would rest with the Homeland Security Secretary, the CDC would “continue to make key medical
and scientiﬁc decisions, such as which biological agents should be included in the select agent list.”340 Such a
structure would clearly leave the CDC with little – if any – regulatory authority in the area of biological agent
controls. In supporting its recommendation, the Administration echoed earlier arguments against expanding
CDC agent oversight to include transfer and possession by asserting that the CDC, at its core, was not –
and had never been – a regulatory body but rather a public health agency, and thus was not equipped to
manage the burdens and mission conﬂicts that accompany government oversight.341 According to DHHS
337H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted). For a full text of the original bill, see H.R. Rpt. 107-609, pt. 1, at 13 (2002).
338Id. at §302(1).
339Homeland Security Research and Critical Infrastructure: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Jerome Hauer, Director, Oﬃce of
Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services).
340Id.; see also Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism Era, supra note 66, at 166, noting “a certain
comfort level has been established both because of long familiarity and because HHS’ mission is to promote health - a mission
that is obviously in accord with the work of most biological scientists. Precisely because of this mission, HHS is ill-suited to
be the federal agency primarily responsible for preventing terrorist misuse of biological agents. That is primarily a national
security or law enforcement function. Its principal motifs entail circumscribing unfettered freedom of action in certain spheres
while increasing the government’s access to and control of information - motifs that are substantially at odds with a mission of
promoting basic scientiﬁc research to the goal of improving human health and welfare.”
341Homeland Security Research and Critical Infrastructure: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Jerome Hauer, Director, Oﬃce of
Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services).
53oﬃcials appearing before Congress in support of the Bill, the new Homeland Security Department, endowed
with a strong “multi-purpose security and regulatory infrastructure,” would be better suited to prevent
unauthorized or miscreant use of select agents.342 The GAO, in its report on the proposed legislation before
the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, agreed with DHHS, noting that the CDC Select
Agent Program’s national defense mission was “closely aligned” with homeland security, and that transfer to
the new Department would enhance eﬃciency and accountability.343 Thus, it was argued that reorganization
would “strike the right balance” by utilizing the CDC’s infectious disease expertise while “capitalizing on
the strategic and logistical” capacity of the new Department, which would hold law enforcement powers
stretching beyond the CDC’s basic veriﬁcation regime.344 This argument suggested a shift in regulatory
emphasis from the promotion of social welfare to the protection of national security.345
Although many in Congress supported the Administration’s position that the CDC did not possess the
proper institutional capacity to oversee select agent regulation, a number of robust objections were raised to
the Homeland Security Bill’s proposed transfer. First, several members of the House expressed concern that
the Bill’s “joint administration” formulation, whereby the Department of Homeland Security managed the
Select Agent Program with CDC guidance and input, eﬀectively allowed the new Department to determine
CDC research priorities.346 Depending on the staﬀ and resources available to the CDC, directives from the
Department related to exercise of the CDC’s “medical and scientiﬁc” expertise had the potential to trump
other CDC projects, impinging on the agency’s independence.347 Moreover, the Administration’s proposal
transferred only the CDC Select Agent Program to the new Department, leaving the USDA’s tracking and
registration program for animal agents, as established by the PHSBPRA, untouched. As Representative
Tauzin noted, if the rationale for transferring the CDC program was that the Department of Homeland
342Id.
343Id. (statement of Jan Heinrich, Director, General Accounting Oﬃce); see also United States General Accounting
Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt
Dual-Purpose Efforts, GAO-02-924T (July 9, 2002).
344Homeland Security Research and Critical Infrastructure: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Jerome Hauer, Director, Oﬃce of
Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services).
345Kellman, Regulation of Biological Research in the Terrorism Era, supra note 66, at 160.
346Id. (statement of Rep. Greenwood).
347Id. (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (noting that “given the always ﬁnite resources of government,” requests from the DHS
to conduct particular research projects would “trump and take priority over CDC’s other projects” and would have the “ability
to push some of CDC’s agenda oﬀ the table temporarily”); see also id. (statement of Rep. Degette) (noting that “practically
speaking, if you want to continue ongoing research and then have research of select agents, you’re not going to be able to do
both, you are going to have to shift resources away from some ongoing research. And I guess the question many of us are asking
is who should be making those decisions – the scientists at CDC and NIH, or somebody who is in this new department who is
superceding their decisions?”). DHHS supporters of the transfer noted that the CDC “consistently rearranges priorites based
on things that are going on.” Id. (statement of Jerome Hauer, Director, Oﬃce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness,
Department of Health and Human Services) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Greenwood).
54Security could provide better coordination with law enforcement, greater investigatory outreach, and stronger
logistical tools to prevent misappropriation of dangerous agents, an equally compelling argument could be
made to remove the USDA’s regulatory oversight, particularly since the USDA’s institutional competence was
based, as with the CDC, in the scientiﬁc identiﬁcation of threat agents.348 To refuse to transfer both programs
also appeared ineﬃcient in light of the program coordination mandated by the PHSBPRA.349 Perhaps the
strongest – and most common – complaint was that the CDC possessed a unique institutional capacity to
balance the need for regulation with the interests of the scientiﬁc community in conducting uninhibited
research for benign purposes.350 According to several researchers testifying before Congress, housing the
348Id. (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (questioning Jerome Hauer, Director, Oﬃce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness,
DHHS, about the absence of a USDA transfer to the DHS). This argument appeared even stronger given that the PHSBPRA
mandated that the CDC and USDA coordinate their regulatory programs in an attempt to eventually move to a single regis-
tration and tracking system. Id. (further pondering, “should both functions be transferred simultaneously, or neither one?”);
see also The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594,
§ 221(c)(2). DHHS oﬃcials counterargued that the USDA in fact had a history of broad regulatory action, particularly in its
inspection and tracking of animal products, that the CDC lacked. Homeland Security Research and Critical Infrastructure:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Jerome Hauer, Director, Oﬃce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health
and Human Services) (responding to questions posed by Rep. Tauzin).
349Id. (statement of Dr. Gail Cassell, Vice President, Eli Lilly and Company). In her testimony, Dr. Cassell oﬀered a strong
eﬃciency rationale: “it is important to coordinate programs related to human, animal, and plant agents because some of the
threats for each are the same...Subtitle C of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 mandated
coordination of activities of HHS and the Secretary of Agriculture regarding overlap agents- -that is, agents that appear on the
separate lists prepared by HHS and Agriculture. Coordination among agencies that have regulations for infectious substances
is important. Better compliance can be achieved if regulations are clear and coherent, streamlined and integrated, based
on real risks, and eﬀectively communicated to individual researchers. Emphasis must be placed on education, guidance and
dissemination of information to research investigators, who must clearly understand their role and responsibilities. Institutional
Biosafety Committees can be strengthened and there should be qualiﬁcations and training for institutional biosafety oﬃcers.
Laboratory scientists and safety managers in institutions must have input into the rule-making procedures and work to assure
that regulations are realistically applied with minimal intrusiveness.” Id. Rep. Tauzin supported Cassell’s analysis, noting
during his introduction of the House Energy and Commerce’s substituted text that “if the agricultural select agent program
remains at USDA, then the Committee views the transfer of the CDC program as only exacerbating existing coordination
problems. We simply do not think it makes sense to transfer half of this program to the new Department, while leaving the
other half at another Federal agency.” Homeland Security Department: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Homeland
Security, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
350Id. Dr. Cassell argued that “HHS has the best scientiﬁc and institutional knowledge to provide oversight of select registration
– and I might add enforcement – and to develop rational enforcement programs.” Id. As Cassel further noted, “security for
biological facilities is diﬀerent from security for nuclear and chemical facilities and must take into account the unique aspects
of work with biological agents. Inappropriate policy measures and regulations to prevent terrorists from acquiring pathogens
could have unintended consequences for research aimed at developing the very countermeasures that could eventually remove
agents from the select agent list. There needs to be a careful balancing of public concern about safety and security with the
need to conduct legitimate research to protect the public.” Id. Ronald Atlas concurred, stating that “the ASM continues to
believe that HHS has the scientiﬁc and institutional knowledge and expertise related to dangerous biological agents, biosafety,
and biosecurity in microbiological and biomedical laboratories and that it is best qualiﬁed to achieve the goal of protecting
the public health and safety without interfering with research, and clinical and diagnostic laboratory medicine.” Homeland
Securities Department: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, President, American Society for Micrbiology) (further
noting that “the proper administration of the select agent program must balance public concerns for safety with the need to
not unduly encumber legitimate research and diagnostic testing. We need an integrated program that adds protection against
the misuse the microbial resources”).
55Select Agent Program within the Department of Homeland Security could result in “undue tension” with
academic and scientiﬁc institutions, particularly if “inappropriate policy measures” restricted legitimate
agent research.351 Finally, critics believed that transferring the CDC oversight function to the Department
of Homeland Security would only result in an unnecessary and unwarranted delay in implementing the
PHSBPRA’s agent registration scheme.352
The arguments for vesting regulatory authority in the CDC eventually won the day.353 The Homeland
Security Act, passed November 25, 2002, left the Select Agent Program in control of the CDC, but required
the CDC to collaborate with the Department of Homeland Security on the list of regulated agents as well
as on laboratory security measures.354 To a certain extent, the CDC beneﬁtted from a strong congressional
backlash against transferring any DHHS functions – including agency oversight of public health emergency
grants and studies related to biological agent countermeasures – with both a public health and national
security component.355 According to several members of Congress, because the staﬀ, resources, and skills
necessary for an eﬀective bioterrorism response mirrored those necessary to counter a standard infectious
351Homeland Security Research and Critical Infrastructure: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Gail Cassell, Vice President, Eli
Lilly and Company); see generally Homeland Securities Department: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Ronald Atlas, President,
American Society for Micrbiology). Dr. Cassell worried about potential DHS control of the CDC regulation: “it is unclear
whether the regulations to be put in place within the next 180 days will be changed, taking on more of a criminal approach
rather than one based upon scientiﬁc knowledge and insights into the biomedical research process utilizing infectious agents.
The Administration’s Bill states that interim regulations will be put in place thereby leaving freedom following the transfer
of authority to DHS for other regulations to be drafted.” Homeland Security Research and Critical Infrastructure: Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Dr. Gail Cassell, Vice President, Eli Lilly and Company).
352Id. As Dr. Cassell noted, a delay in implementing the CDC regulation would slow down development of the biodefense
research agenda by tying laboratories up in the registration process. Id.
353In fact, the House of Representatives’ version of H.R. 5005 kept DHHS in control of a majority of the federal public
health programs dealing with bioterrorism. See Robert Roos, House Panel Backs Keeping HHS In Charge of Bioterrorism
Preparedness, July 22, 2002, available at http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/dhsleg.html. In
doing so, the House version satisﬁed “the desire of public health groups not to transfer public health aspects of bioterrorism
programs” to DHS, and clearly responded to the concerns of public health groups that a transfer would undermine eﬀorts to
strengthen the public health system, as the CDC administers most biodefense programs. Id. The House version, which was
developed by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, was accepted by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security
with few changes. Id.
354Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, § 304 (2002); Robert Roos, Home-
land Security Law Leaves HHS in Control of Bioterrorism Preparedness, November 22, 2002, available at
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/homelnd.html. The text of H.R. 5005 was eventually substi-
tuted with the text of H.R. 5170, a compromise version. On November 19, 2002, S. Amdt. 4901 substituted text essentially the
same as H.R. 5710 into the House bill. See Bill Summary & Status File for H.R. 5005, THOMAS, available at thomas.loc.gov,
last visited on April 5, 2004. The House aggreed to the Senate amendment on November 22, 2002. Id.
355See, e.g., United States General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve
Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts, supra note 343 (stating that the transfer of
many DHHS functions to the DHS would “hinder the simultaneous oversight of biodefense and public health” undertaken by
the agency); see also Stephen Krupin, Congress Warned Against Shifting CDC Programs; Ridge, GAO Diﬀer on Bioterror
Transfer, Atlanta J. & Const., June 26, 2002, at 3A.
56disease outbreak, dual-purpose programs were rightly the province of public health agencies like DHHS and
the CDC. In fact, it was even argued that a less stringent regime, situating dual-purpose programs within
DHHS but leaving authority in the hands of the new DHS would “create more problems than it would
solve,” particularly in terms of ultimate program responsibility.356 The main rationale proferred for keeping
the Select Agent Program within the CDC, however, appeared to be that the CDC in fact possessed the
appropriate experience balancing concerns for safety with a need to support legitimate research and diagnostic
testing.357 Moreover, because the CDC had already begun implementation of the PHSBPRA’s provisions,
including the requirement to coordinate regulation with the USDA, a transfer would have served mainly to
disrupt and delay the imposition of tighter agent controls. Since the passage of the Homeland Security Act
in November 2002, calls for removal of the CDC’s regulatory authority have not publicly resurfaced.
VI.
Conclusion: Future Challenges for CDC Regulation358
Several challenges remain as the CDC continues its regulatory oversight of the possession, transfer, and
shipment of select agents. First, as previously noted, several agencies in addition to the CDC have authority
to regulate the interstate shipment of infectious agents. In fact, while the CDC clearly plays a dominant
role in monitoring the location and movement of select agents domestically, its regulations exist alongside
a number of other federal rules that also aﬀect agent control.359 In 1990, the CDC ﬁrst recognized that
356In testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Rep. Tauzin voiced the views of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, noting that “the Committee does not believe it is feasible to separate authority from
responsibility, or to separate the oﬃcials charged with administering those responsibilities from the personnel required to do
so...neither a whoelesale transfer of these responsibilities, nor some unusual splitting of responsibilities, is warranted. Homeland
Security Department: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Rep.
Tauzin).
357According to Robert Roos, opposition from public health and research groups prompted Congress to drop the transfer provi-
sions from H.R. 5005 it passed its version of the bill. Robert Roos, Homeland Security Law Leaves HHS in Control of Bioterror-
ism Preparedness, supra note 340, available at http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/homelnd.html.
For example, Tara O’Toole, Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, argued that “there is a
real danger that by sequestering bioterrorism programs in Homeland Security, they will be treated as ’emergency use only’ func-
tions... reducing the eﬃciency of preparedness eﬀorts and quite possibly compromising response eﬀectiveness.” Krupin, supra
note 340, at 3A. O’Toole further stated that “it is a very tall order to ask a single agency to develop national security strategy
and create a sophisticated scientiﬁc research and development capability over a broad range of disciplines and technology.” Id.
Ronald Atlas of the American Society for Micrbiology further argued that “the CDC has a long history of regulatory oversight
concerning bio-safety.”
359See discussion infra page 2. No single agency covers all aspects regarding the shipment of infectious substances. Packaging
and Handling of Infectious Substances and Select Agents, 64 Fed. Reg. 58022, supra note 9, at 58024.
57confusion existed among those transporting select agents as to how the varying federal agent requirements
related to the CDC rule.360 Yet it wasn’t until 1999 that the CDC published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
designed to harmonize its regulation with shipping and handling requirements imposed by the Department of
Transportation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the U.S. Postal Service, among others.361 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking announced the CDC’s
intention to revise its guidelines to adhere more closely to other federal regulations and to ensure that shippers
and handlers were “aware of and utilized” appropriate packaging when shipping infectious substances.362 In
developing its revisions, the CDC consulted with the other federal agencies involved in agent regulation, many
of whom are reportedly revising their guidelines as well.363 The numerous changes proposed by the CDC
include the substitution of the Department of Transportation’s term “infectious substance” for the CDC’s
“etiologic agent,” the adoption of terminology used by the International Air Transport Association and
the Department of Transportation to describe agent containers, including “primary receptacle,” “secondary
packaging,” and “outer packaging,” and a revision of the volume/weight limts to comply with Department
of Transportation and international guidelines.364 The CDC noted that it intends for its proposed rule to
reduce the regulatory burden currently imposed on interstate shippers of agents while improving packaging
standards to better protect the public health.365 After publication of the Notice, the CDC invited comments
from shippers of infectious materials, persons who transport or handle packages, public health oﬃcials, and
medical and research laboratories on any of the requirements contained in the proposed rule, particularly
those requirements believed by the scientiﬁc community to be inconsistent with other regulatory authority.366
Nevertheless, nearly ﬁve years later, the CDC has not published a ﬁnal rule and has not indicated any
intention to do so. In order to create a comprehensive regulatory regime and ensure full compliance with
CDC rules, the CDC must work to coordinate its requirements with those of other agencies.
360Id. The CDC discovered this confusion during the course of its 1990 proposed rulemaking to update existing agent packaging
requirements, see Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 55 Fed. Reg. 7678 (March 2, 1990), when shippers commenting on
the proposed rule suggested harmonizing shipping regulations across agencies. Id. Commenters noted that confusion stemmed
from substantive diﬀerences in the requirements of each agency and the use of varying terminology. Id.
361Id. at 58023-58024.
362Id. at 58024.
363Id.
364Id. at 58024-58025.
365Id. at 58026.
366Id. at 58024.
58A second challenge facing the CDC will be harmonizing its select agent list with similar domestic and
international compilations. As previously discussed, in 1999, the CDC developed a “critical agents” list
which it used to guide state and local preparedness programs, to determine the formulary for its Strategic
National Stockpile, and to ascertain reagents and protocols for the Laboratory Response Network.367 This
critical agents list is signiﬁcantly broader than the select agent list, encompassing less pathogenic – but
nonetheless disruptive – agents such as salmonella and shigella.368 The critical agents list also includes a
number of highly infectious pathogens, such as Western Equine Encephalitis, not covered by the CDC’s
regulation.369 The watchlists of several international regulators closely resemble the CDC’s critical agents
lists in depth and breadth. For example, the Australia group, a consortium of 34 countries that imposes
limits on the export of materials involved in the development of biological weapons, includes food and
waterborne pathogens on its list of restricted material, while NATO’s agent control directorate lists dengue
and inﬂuenza among restricted agents.370 To date, the CDC has not considered expanding the select agent
list to include agents on either its critical agents or international lists, despite the fact that bioterrorism
experts have suggested that an attack with a less pathogenic agent represents a more conceivable threat.
Clearly, imposing strict regulatory controls on more than the current 40 agents would necessitate a much
greater commitment of resources from the CDC and Congress and could represent a severe burden for smaller
laboratories, who in turn may discontinue legitimate work on select agents for biodefense and other worthy
purposes. One commenter has suggested dividing CDC’s regulatory oversight into two tiers, with highly
lethal agents, such as anthrax or plague, subject to more stringent regulation; alternatives to an “all-or-
nothing” approach are likely available.371 As the CDC continues to conduct biennial reviews of its select
agent list, the agency must consider gaps in its monitoring that could undermine the ultimate purpose of its
regulatory mission: to ensure that the public health is protected from both accidental and nefarious release
of infectious diseases.
Finally, as states begin to institute their own regulatory requirements, federal preemption questions are likely
to arise. Although the lines beween the federal and state regulatory domain have not always been clear, it
367See discussion supra pp. 32-33.
368Id.
369Martin Enserink and David Malakoﬀ, Congress Weighs Select Agent Update, 294 Science 1438 (2001).
370Id.
371Id.
59is undisputed that the regulation of public health has traditionally been a police power of the states, while
the regulation of national security was given to the federal government by the Constitution.372 Bioterrorism
regulation falls between these two ends of the spectrum, encompassing both public health and national
security elements. Thus, the question of who has primary regulatory authority is a murky one. Since the
passage of the PHSBPRA in 2002, three states – Arkansas, Maryland, and North Carolina – have passed
legislation establishing biological agent registries to monitor the intrastate possession and transfer of agents
through state registration procedures.373 A fourth state – Massachusetts – has similar legislation pending
before its State Senate.374 While all four statutes make explicit mention of the CDC regulations and note
that their purpose is to enhance cooperation with the CDC in its oversight of select agents, they impose
substantially similar requirements as the oﬃcial CDC rules found at 42 C.F.R. § 73, raising concerns about
whether they are preempted by the CDC’s regulation.
Under the doctrine of federal preemption, state law can be preempted by federal statutory law when Congress
exercises a granted power.375 Preemption can occur by express provision, by a conﬂict between federal and
state law, or by implication where Congress “so thoroughly occupies a legislative ﬁeld as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”376 To date, Congress has not
preempted state regulation of biological agents by express provision. As to any implication of preemption,
the CDC itself has speciﬁcally stated that its regulation is not meant to preempt other federal regulations
governing the shipment and transfer of biological agents.377 Thus, it is doubtful that one could argue that
Congress has implied a diﬀerent result, as it has, for example, in the area of nuclear power, which involves
comprehensive regulation by a single federal agency. Moreover, Congress has consistently encouraged states
to take proactive steps to respond to the threat of bioterrorism. To give just one example, the CDC and
representatives of several states are in the process of implementing the Model State Emergency Health Powers
372Victoria Sutton, Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation: The Struggle to Protect States’
Sovereignty While Preserving National Security, 6 The Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 93 (Spring 2001), available at
http://www.ttu.edu/biodefense/publications.php.
373A.C.A. § 20-36-101 (2003); Md. Code Ann. § 17-602 (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-479 (2004).
374MA S.B. 511 (2003).
375Sutton, supra note 310, at 2. Congress’ “granted power” is the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause.
376Id. at 14 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), and
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), respectively).
377Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55190, supra note 71, at
55192. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Supreme Court held that ﬁeld preemption requires a clear
showing that Congress meant to occupy the ﬁeld. This showing could be discerned according to either (1) the pervasiveness
of the regulation, which would support an inference that Congress left no room for state law, or (2) recognition of a federal
interest so dominant that the federal system would have been assumed to preclude state law.
60Act, designed to update state quarantine laws to provide greater authority in the event of a bioterrorist
strike.378 Current trends in federalism also suggest a shift towards greater state power.379 Yet an issue of
conﬂict preemption clearly may remain. On the one hand, it can be argued that the CDC regulation only
creates a ﬂoor for agent control. If CDC regulation is no more than a ﬂoor, states are free to impose their own
registration requirements as necessary. This is a compelling argument given that public health regulation
vests ﬁrst in the states, and that dual federal-state regulation may ensure fewer gaps in oversight. On the
other hand, many laboratories have already experienced signiﬁcant implementation diﬃculties related to the
cost of complying with the CDC regulation, raising worries that additional state requirements may lower
the eﬀectiveness of the CDC rule.380 Moreover, the Supreme Court has found conﬂict preemption when the
federal government has created a “complete scheme of regulation,” a context arguably present in 42 C.F.R.
§ 73.381 This issue has not yet been brought before a federal court, and clearly merits greater discussion.
In summary, the CDC’s regulation of biological agents can be characterized as an expansion of the agency’s
role from simple monitor of physical security to overseer of a comprehensive national regulatory scheme. The
AEDPA and PHSBPRA instituted important augmentations of the CDC’s power to prevent unauthorized
agent acccess and rightly reﬂected the nation’s changing national security interests. However, until other
countries adopt similar legislation or impose more stringent restraints on the movement of agent cultures,
successful CDC oversight will depend in large part on the integrity of laboratory workers and on the continued
commitment of the academic and scientiﬁc community to full compliance.
378See http://www.publichealthlaw.net.
379Sutton, supra note 310, at 14.
380See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 550 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Congress’ passage of a federal law
imposing mandatory sanctions on a foreign country preempted a more stringent state law because the state law presented “an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives”).
381See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (stating that “where the federal government...has enacted a complete scheme
of regulation...state cannot, inconsistenly with the purpose of Congress, conﬂict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the
federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations”).
61Appendix 1382
DHHS Select and Overlaps Agents
HHS NON-OVERLAP SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS
•
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
•
Coccidioides posadasii
• Ebola viruses
• Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus)
• Lassa fever virus
• Marburg virus
• Monkeypox virus
•
Rickettsia prowazekii
•
Rickettsia rickettsii
• South American haemorrhagic fever viruses
o
Junin
382Available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap.
62o
Machupo
o Sabia
o
Flexal
o
Guanarito
•
Tick-borne encephalitis complex (ﬂavi) viruses
o
Central European tick-borne encephalitis
o
Far Eastern tick-borne encephalitis
o
Russian spring and summer encephalitis
o Kyasanur forest disease
o
Omsk hemorrhagic fever
•
Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
• Variola minor virus (Alastrim)
63• Yersinia pestis
• Abrin
• Conotoxins
• Diacetoxyscirpenol
• Ricin
• Saxitoxin
• Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins
• Tetrodotoxin
HIGH CONSEQUENCE LIVESTOCK PATHOGENS AND TOXINS/ SELECT AGENTS (OVERLAP AGENTS)
•
Bacillus anthracis
•
Brucella abortus
• Brucella melitensis
•
Brucella suis
•
Burkholderia mallei (formerly Pseudomonas mallei)
64• Burkholderia pseudomallei (formerly Pseudomonas pseudomallei)
• Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium
•
Coccidioides immitis
•
Coxiella burnetii
• Eastern equine encephalitis virus
• Hendra virus
•
Francisella tularensis
•
Nipah Virus
• Rift Valley fever virus
•
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
•
Botulinum neurotoxin
• Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
• Shigatoxin
65•
Staphylococcal enterotoxin.
•
T-2 toxin
USDA HIGH CONSEQUENCE LIVESTOCK PATHOGENS AND TOXINS (NON-OVERLAP)
•
Akabane virus
•
African swine fever virus
•
African horse sickness virus
•
Avian inﬂuenza virus (highly pathogenic)
• Blue tongue virus (Exotic)
•
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent
•
Camel pox virus
• Classical swine fever virus
•
Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater) Foot and mouth disease virus
66•
Goat pox virus
•
Lumpy skin disease virus
• Japanese encephalitis virus
•
Malignant catarrhal fever virus (Exotic)
• Menangle virus
• Mycoplasma capricolum/
•
M.F38/M. mycoides capri
• Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides
•
Newcastle disease virus (VVND)
•
Peste Des Petits Ruminants virus
•
Rinderpest virus
•
Sheep pox virus
67• Swine vesicular disease virus
•
Vesicular stomatitis virus (Exotic)
LISTED PLANT PATHOGENS
•
Liberobacter africanus
•
Liberobacter asiaticus
• Peronosclerospora philippinensis
•
Phakopsora pachyrhizi
•
Plum Pox Potyvirus
•
Ralstonia solanacearum race 3, biovar 2
•
Schlerophthora rayssiae var zeae
• Synchytrium endobioticum
•
Xanthomonas oryzae
68•
Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain)
69Appendix 2383
CDC Timeline for Implementation of its Interim Final Rule
EFFECTIVE DATES
Date Applicants Possessing
Agents on or Before 2/7/03
Applicants Not Possessing
on or Before 2/7/03
Dec.
13,
2002
Publication
of
in-
terim
Fi-
nal
Rule
Publication
of
in-
terim
Fi-
nal
Rule
Feb. 7, 2003 Safety; Emergency
Response; Training; Records;
Notiﬁcation
of Theft, Loss or Release
Safety; Emergency
Response; Training;
Records; Notiﬁcation of
Theft, Loss or Release;
DOJ review for entity, RO,
and
individuals; Transfer
Section
Eﬀective
383Available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/cdc-05a.htm.
70Mar.
12,
2003
Certiﬁes
that
ap-
pli-
ca-
tions
for
DOJ
re-
view
for
en-
tity
and
RO
Sub-
mit-
ted;
Trans-
fer
Sec-
tion
Ef-
fec-
tive
April 12, 2003 Application for DOJ review
for
Individuals submitted; Entity
and
RO DOJ review completed
71June
12,
2003
Individual
DOJ
Re-
view
Com-
plete;
De-
vel-
op-
ment
of
Se-
cu-
rity
Plan
Development
of
Se-
cu-
rity
Plan
Sept. 12, 2003 Security Plan Implemented;
Training (Security
Provisions)
Security Plan
Implemented;
Training (Security Provisions)
Nov. 12, 2003 Registration Section
Eﬀective; Entity must be in
full compliance
with 42 CFR 73.0
Registration Section Eﬀective;
Entity must be in full
compliance with 42 CFR 73.0
72